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This research paper proposes a framework for capturing and 
studying Technical Management Oversight  (TMO) knowledge from past 
and ongoing international programs. Interviews were conducted with key 
program personnel from several programs to populate the framework 
with program data.  Programs considered were HAWK, ROLAND, LANCE, 
MEADS, the International Space Station, and MLRS TGW.  These 
programs had various degrees of international participation and various 
degrees of international coupling.  Valuable insights were captured that 
can be applied to the structure and conduct of ongoing and future 
international programs.  Among other conclusions, it is found that U.S. 
policy has not kept pace with international programs, the degree of 
international coupling within a program strongly affects management 
complexity and it is important to know the customers. Restrictions on 
technology transfer and release of information dramatically affect TMO. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  PURPOSE 
This research paper advances understanding of technical 
management for complex, internationally acquired systems.  A Technical 
Management Oversight (TMO) framework is used to present and analyze 
six significant international systems developed involving the United 
States Army and NASA.  
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
The industrial revolution, fueled by commercial opportunity, 
spawned previously undreamed systems.  These systems were made 
possible by application of the scientific method and the discovery of new 
materials and phenomenon.  The discovery and investigation of electricity 
and the development of transistors, integrated circuits, computers and 
networks, continues to reshape our world. 
New systems are being developed that are increasingly complex 
with competing requirements, containing multiple subsystems with 
millions of components, having computers with millions of lines of 
computer source code.  The discipline of system engineering has emerged 
to address this complexity.  
DoD engages in the development of complex systems.  Many 
organizations are involved, playing different roles.  Various approaches to 
contracting and distribution of development responsibility are used, 
involving varying degrees of contractor - contractor and Government – 
contractor teaming. The Program Management Office (PMO) is the DoD 
focus of control for execution of contracts, contractor oversight, and 
coordination with other government agencies.  The prime contractor has 
the responsibility for fulfilling the contract.  The Government program 
office must establish an appropriate technical management approach to 
satisfy regulatory and statutory requirements, to hold the contractor 
1 
accountable, and to overcome technical risk that cannot be directly 
addressed by the contractor.  For international programs, due to security 
and technical transfer considerations, some TMO functions may be split 
between an International Program Office (IPO) and National Product 
Offices (NPOs) .   This interface adds complexity and increases the 
importance of establishing “agreed to” TMO objectives.  
 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
a.  What is a candidate framework for understanding 
technical management oversight of international 
acquisition and how might that framework be 
applied to international Air and Missile Defense 
(AMD) programs? 
 
This question is answered by Chapter III, “Framework for 
Technical Management Oversight (TMO)” and Chapter IV, “TMO 
Framework Applied.”  The write-ups in Chapter IV show the TMO 
framework to be an effective tool for documenting TMO for international 
programs. 
 
2.  SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
a.  What is the role and purpose of Technical 
Management Oversight for acquisition? 
The straightforward answer to this question can be found 
among the pages documenting interview results in chapter IV:  
dev
such a
techniThe role and purpose of TMO is to ensure the system being 
eloped meets the User’s needs.     To be effective, TMO must (1) manage technical resources 
s a Research Development and Engineering Center (RDEC) and 
cal support contractors; (2) manage technical requirements (3) 
2 
manage risk;  (4)  monitor contract performance; (5)  coordinate User 
participation when necessary in the development process; and (6) define 
technical effort within contract statements of work. 
 
b.  What are the unique international TMO issues that 
must be jointly addressed by the participating U.S.  
National Program Office (NPO) and International 
Program Office (IPO) managers for an international 
system acquisition? 
The answers to this question can be found among the pages 
documenting interview results in chapter IV.   An international 
development program involving the U.S. may include one IPO and an 
NPO for each participating nation.  The IPO will have primary 
responsibility for developing the system and managing a prime 
contractor, similar to a U.S. only program.   
Security and control of U.S. technology information must be 
addressed.  It is in the U.S. interest for the international program to be 
successful, but information that reveal vulnerabilities of other systems 
must be protected.    The U.S. NPO will have responsibility to ensure 
proper authorizations are obtained before U.S. information is transferred 
to the IPO. 
If a partial release of sensitive U.S. information is planned, 
then some technical support and separate development contracts 
managed by the NPO may be needed. Coordinating these separate but 
dependent development activities with the primary activity is critical. 
The unique U.S.  documentation to satisfy the U.S. 
acquisition process should be minimized. 
Early involvement of the U.S. User requires careful 
coordination.  
The NPO must help the U.S. User to understand whether or 
not U.S requirements are incorporated in the international program.  
3 
Where requirements shortfalls exist, the U.S. NPO must coordinate with 
the IPO and the other NPOs. 
 
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis is limited to TMO for internationally 
acquired systems. Programs considered are tactical missile systems or 
missile defense systems managed from project offices located at Redstone 
Arsenal in Alabama.  The International Space Station is also considered.  
For each program, the following are addressed: 
(1) Executive Control 
(2) National Interaction 
(3) TMO Funding 
(4) TMO Organizational Aspects 
(5) Research, Development and Engineering Center 
(RDEC)/Contractor Technical Support 
(6) Management of Technical Requirements 
(7) Management of Technical Risk 
(8) Technical Monitoring Capability 
(9) Direct Technical Contribution 
(10) Control of and Access to Technical Data 
(11) User Participation 
(12) Cost Share/Work Share Affecting TMO 
(13) Preparation of Contract Statements of Work 
(14) U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to Next Program Phase 
 
The following are not addressed: 
(1) Preparation of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
(2) Personnel Management Issues 
(3) Group Dynamics/Leadership 
4 
(4) Operational Test Issues 
(5) Use of GOTS/COTS vs Developmental Items 
(6) Development Methodologies 
(7) Budget/Finance 
(8) Earned Value Monitoring 
(9) Contracts 
 
E.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research investigation included literature searches and detailed 
interviews with technically knowledgeable program leaders in past and 
ongoing international programs.  The literature search included the 
following: 
(1) Regulatory requirements affecting TMO for U.S. Acquisitions,  
(2) International program considerations, and  
(3) System engineering principles and practices. 
 
The interviews were guided by a common framework summarized 
in Figure 1 and detailed later.  The interviews were open-ended technical 
discussions intended to identify issues associated with individual 
international programs and to identify common themes between the 
different programs considered.   
 
F.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY   
The thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter I:  Introduction  -- Introduces the research topic, bounds 
the discussion and establishes the research methodology. 
Chapter II:  Literature Search – Summarizes pertinent information 
to establish a basis for discussion.  Areas reviewed include the following: 




















Figure 1:  Technical Management Oversight Process 
B.  International Considerations 
C.  System Engineering Principles  
Chapter III:  TMO Framework -- Introduces a framework for 
describing TMO within an international program and describes how this 
framework will be applied to the programs considered in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV: Technical Management Oversight Framework Applied  
-- Describes  technical management oversight for several past and 
present international programs using the framework described in chapter 
III as a guide.  Systems selected for review are as follows: 
A.  HAWK 
B.  ROLAND 
C.  LANCE 
D.  Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) 
E.  International Space Station (ISS) 
6 
F.  Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Tactical Guided 
Warhead (TGW) 
Chapter V:  Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations – 
Analyzes and Summarizes lessons learned from the interviews.  For 
common issues, recommendations are suggested.  
 
G.  RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
• Investigate the international programs presented in this 
research paper from the perspective of the international 
partner.  
• Optimize the framework presented here by eliminating 
redundant framework elements and apply this framework to 
Navy and Air Force programs. 
• Take each element of the International TMO Framework and 
explore in a more in-depth fashion its application on a wide 
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II.  LITERATURE SEARCH 
 
A.  STATUTORY AND 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT  
1.  Overview  
The Executive Branch of 
Government  and Congress 
establish the environment for 
military acquisition.  Congress 
authorizes activities and provides 
funding while the President 
establishes his priorities, requests 
budgets from Congress and 
executes the acquisition process.  
The roles of Congress and the 
President are established by the Constitution of the United States.  
Following budget approval, the Executive Branch Department of Defense 
(DOD) executes the defense acquisition process.  Laws directly affect this 
process, and DOD 5000 Directives and Instructions provide a framework 
for acquisition.  The Acquisition Executive (AE) from the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is responsible to 
establish the specific process to be followed by each acquisition program.  
The DoD acquisition system exists 
to secure and sustain the nation’s 
investments in technologies, programs, and 
product support necessary to achieve the 
National Security Strategy and support the 
United States Armed Forces. The 
Department’s investment strategy must be 
postured to support not only today’s force, 
but also the next force, and future forces 
beyond that. The primary objective of 
Defense acquisition is to acquire quality 
products that satisfy user needs with 
measurable improvements to mission 
accomplishment and operational support, in 
a timely manner, and at a fair and 
reasonable price.  
 
(Introduction to Defense Acquisition 
Management). 
Table 1 highlights perspectives, responsibilities and objectives of 
the executive branch for defense acquisition. 
 
2.  Program Management 
For each acquisition program there is a program manager with 
responsibility for executing that program.  The program manager must 
obtain approval from the AE for an acquisition strategy, request a 
budget, select contractors, manage development contracts, report to the 
AE and report to congress, and mind a myriad of details.  The Program 
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set Perspectives Responsibilities Objectives 








• Sign legislation (President) 
• Commander in Chief  (Pres) 
• Negotiate with Congress 
• Make Decisions for Acquisition 
Programs (Acquisition 
Executive) 
• Issue Directives/Regulations 
• Contract with Industry 
• Satisfy National Security 
Objectives 
• Balanced Force Structure 
• Field Weapon Systems to 
Defeat Threats to National 
Security 
• Eliminate Fraud Waste and 
Abuse in Federal 
Procurement  
ager (PM) is the key person in the acquisition process for each  
ram. Figure 2 makes this plain.  This is the program environment for 
mestic defense acquisition program involving only the U.S.  While 
 diagram may appear complex, it is relatively elegant.  From this 
ram it can be surmized that the PM for a domestic U.S. defense 
uisition program is central to program execution. 
 3.  Rules of the Road 
DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2 and DOD 5000.2-R, hereinafter 
rred to collectively as DOD  5000, set forth the statutes that apply 
 define the processes, procedures and guidelines to be used for 
uisition of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS).    
DOD 5000 has evolved.  Since 1994 the focus has been to enable 
amlined, tailored acquisition while providing a standardized 
ework to guide all DOD acquisition.  The DOD 5000 documents 
marize statutory requirements for MDAPs and establish DOD 
latory requirements for MDAPs.  These documents provide the single 
of guidance for execution of all DOD acquisition.  Each program is 
10 
 
Figure 2:  PM Centric Acquisition (from Introduction to 
Defense Acquisition Management) 
expected to develop an acquisition strategy, for approval by the cognizant 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), that establishes how the 
requirements of DOD 5000 will be met.  The overall “cradle to grave” 
acquisition process is summarized by Figure 3. 
System development, occurs primarily following milestone B during 
the System Development and Demonstration phase (SD&D).  Much of the 
guidance in DOD 5000 applies to TMO.   
 
a.  Significant Statutes 
While many laws have been written that influence DOD 
system acquisition,  a few that are worth highlighting, because of their 
influence on Technical Management Oversight.  The Clinger-Cohen Act 
(40 U.S.C. 1427) requires special reporting for information intensive  
11 
 
Figure 3:  The DOD 5000 Acquistion Model (From DODD 5000.1) 
12 
systems and requires coordination in order to ensure development of 
effective information  exchange capabilities.  The National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370d) directly affects system 
development because of legal constraints placed on the use of hazardous 
and environmentally damaging substances and materials. Similarly, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370d) 
constrains system design.  Legal mandates for independent system 




b. Guidance  
DOD 5000 regulates the establishment of tailored MDAP 
acquisition programs and establishes mandatory procedures for MDAPs.  
There is some ambiguity about what guidance applies to International 
programs, except for the specific international program guidance. For 
example, the internationa program section of DOD 5000.2-R makes the 
military services responsible to ensure the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD); the Command, Control, Communications, Computers 
and Intelligence Support Plan (C4ISP); the Test and Evaluation Master 
Plan (TEMP) and the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) documents are 
properly staffed for international programs.  The following paragraphs 
highlight mandatory procedures that have a direct bearing on Technical 
Management Oversight for MDAPS.  To understand the degree of 
mandate associated with an international program, careful revue should 
be made of DOD 5000 and the legally binding references in the 
applicable international Memorandum of Understanding.   
 
(1)  Program Goals should be well established in an 
APB including thresholds and objectives for cost, schedule and 
performance. Consequences for not meeting the APB should be clearly 
established.  Cost As and Independent Variable (CAIV) activity should be 
performed to enable trade-offs between system requirements, cost and 
schedule.  This activity should be done in close coordination with the 
system user.  
 
(2)  An Acquisition Strategy should be developed early 
in the program and updated for each subsequent program phase.  This 
document tailors DOD 5000 to each MDAP an is a contract between the 
Program Manager and the Acquisition Executive that establishes how the 
program will be executed.  Electronic data exchange is described.  The 
programs approach to management of people, funding, risk, staffing, 
contracting and oversight are described.  Special considerations for 
simulation based acquisition, software develoment, the technical 
management approach and business strategy are all described.   
 
(3)  The program’s approach to Test and Evaluation 
should coordinate Developmental Testing (DT) and Operational Testing 
13 
(OT).  DT and OT obtjectives should be placed in the Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan (TEMP), which is a required document for all MDAPs.  Plans 
should be established for information technology security certification, 
interoperability certification, information assurance testing, development 
of model and simulations that are validated against real test data and 
anti-tamper verification testing.   
 
(4)  Considerations for System Engineering drawn from 
technical literature are described later in chapter II section C, however, 
guidance is provided in DOD 5000.2-R that is comprehensive.  
Considerable guidance is provided for management of technical risk, 
requirements, open systems design, software develoment, design for 
supportability, quality and configuration management.  
 
(5)  Other Guidance from DOD 5000.2-R covers topics 
of information superiority; Reliability, Availability, Maintainabiliy (RAM); 
interoperability, insensitive munitions, corrosion prevention and control, 
electromagnetic effects and spectrum supportability, required reviews, … 
and so forth. 
 
B.  INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  Overview 
The primary source of information for this section is the research 
report by Catington, Knudson and Yodzis entitled “Transatlantic 
Armaments Cooperation.”  They note that transatlantic international 
cooperative development of weapon systems during the past 40 years has 
been done in order to distribute costs for weapon systems development, 
to leverage technology from partner nations and to improve 
interoperability among partner systems.   These goals are complicated by 
the conflicting national politics, protection of the industrial base, 
14 
protection of technology, national priorities, requirements harmonization, 
the implementation of the partnership, and culture.  The importance of 
an international Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that establishes 
an agreement for the nature and extent of an international MDAP cannot 
be over-emphasized.  Figure 4 summarizes the considerations for an 






















Figure 4:  International Considerations 
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Separate national political processes reduce program stability, 
because each partner nation must gain political support for funding.  
The decision processes are different, may not be synchronized, and may 
be strongly affected by National elections.  New Government 
administrations may require time to establish funding priorities, and 
they may not agree with the funding priorities of past national 
administrations.  During the time that separate national funding 
decision processes are under way, uncertainty can be expected.  Who 
knows if program participation by each nation will continue?  However, 
there is a pair of stabilizing influences: The desire for success once 
started; and an aversion to being identified as the nation that quit.  
National pride is at stake.  However, the nature of the threat changes, 
war-fighting doctrine or national priorities change, a partner nation may 
cease to have a need for the system.  In that case, political support would 
probably be unsustainable.  
 
3.  Economics 
Economics is the foundation that makes programs possible.  What 
often makes international MDAPs economically unique as compared to 
domestic MDAPS are the agreements for sharing of costs and work, 
multiple funding decision processes and exchange rates. Multiple 
national economies influence availability of funds.  The general economic 
health of industry within each country may affect the ability of the 
countries to participate.  Exchange rates may become an issue.  If 
international monetary exchange rates fluctuate over the life of a 
program, then the countries may pay more or less than expected.  
 
4.  Requirements 
Harmonizing requirements for an international MDAP is perhaps 
the most important activity, and it is not an easy process.  Nations have 
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differing interests and priorities.  Threat, need date, functions to be 
performed (mobility, threat detection capability, communications, speed, 
automation, etc), characteristics (accuracy,  display/labeling language,  
weight, size, transportability, etc. ), and required operational 
environments must be harmonized.  National laws and regulations may 
conflict.  Fortunately DOD now mandates the use of performance based 
requirements and specifications, which make international MDAPs more 
possible.   The streamlining of acquisition through use of commercial 
standards and performance specifications is gaining favor outside of the 
U.S. DOD as well as within.  This emerging common approach helps as 
partners harmonize program requirements.  Additionally, understanding 
the needs of the partner nations is essential to making needed 
compromises.   
Capability not needed by one nation will be opposed by that nation 
in an effort to hold down cost.  Capability percieved as important by that 
nation will be vigorously promoted.  The differences must be negotiated, 
and there is no assured resolution of any difference.  One way to address 
this issue is the creation of national variants with tailored end items 
built around common core capability.  Establishing Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs), a set of agreed essential requirements, is important. 
These KPPs define the potential trade space for Cost As an Independent 
Variable (CAIV) tradeoffs when test results emerge and as costs become 
better understood.  Agreeing on the time frame for development and the 
extent of international variants of the core system are important as well. 
 
5.  Security 
Security for an international MDAP is both collective and 
individual.  The effectiveness of a military system often depends on 
denying potential adversaries access to system vulnerability information.  
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Thus, it is in the common interest of the partners to protect system 
information that may reveal vulnerabilities.   
The U.S. may bring technologies into the cooperative effort that it 
considers to be advanced, and may be unwilling to fully disclose these 
technologies.  Access to some technology may be restricted to “black box” 
devices where the inputs and outputs are advertised, but the internal 
design or manufacturing details are not divulged.  In the case of 
advanced computer algorithms, software source code may not be 
divulged, only the executable code.  Partner nations may be 
uncomfortable with this, however, it should be kept in mind that 
protection of information even within a one nation development activity is 
not unusual.  For developments involving more than one company, 
detailed design and process information is often with-held from other 
companies by the owning company to protect company interests.   
The U.S. has policies that establish a security framework for U.S. 
participation in international MDAPS, including processes for the 
transfer of technology to foreign entities.  The DOD security directives 
that apply are DOD Directive (DODD) 5230.11, DODD 5230.20 and 
DODD 5000.39.  Technology transfers are governed by the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and DODD 2040.2.  Industrial 
security policy, which the participating companies must follow, is 
established in the National Industrial Security Operating Manual 
(NISPOM).  The document that will establishes security procedures once 
information is within the program is the Program Security Instruction 
(PSI), which will be unique to each international MDAP and must be 
agreed to by all national partners. 
18 
6.  Management 
Historically, cooperative international developments have involved 
similar management structures, as shown in Figure 5, with variations on  
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from the point of view of the U.S. is fair when the U.S. provides the 
largest share of funding.  However, the partner nations often prefer to 
have a more even distribution of responsibilities.  In some cases, 
program leadership is shared or rotated between partner nations.  It has 
also been shown that this approach can be effective.  Regardless of the 
assignment of responsibilities for each nation, the agreements made 
early are important, because they tend to remain throughout the life of 
the program. 
 
7.  Industry 
Industrial arrangements between companies participating in the 
development and production vary widely for cooperative international 
development as with domestic U.S. development.  The nature of these 
arrangements will depend on the guidance provided by the partner 
nations during solicitation and on the industrial agreements that the 
winning contractor is able to negotiate with partner companies.  Many 
are the possibilities. 
 
8.  National Acquisition Processes 
The context for an international cooperative development makes a 
difficult activity more difficult.  The development activity must satisfy the 
authorizing bodies of each participating nation in order for that nation to 
continue participation.   Each partner nation will have a bureaucracy 
that needs information and demands to be heard.  Section A of this 
chapter highlights the DOD 5000 guidance that affects U.S. programs.   
It is clear that U.S. laws and regulations must be followed by U.S. 
leadership in the negotiations to structure an international cooperative 
development.  However, it is not always clear which legal and regulatory 
requirements must be followed during the execution of an international 
program, especially if the different participant nations have different legal 
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and regulatory requirements.  Once signed, a Memorandum Of 
Understanding (MOU) between Nations establishing an agreement for the 
conduct of a development effort will generally take precedence.  The 
difficulty of satisfying the acquisition processes for the participating 
nations increases with the number of participants.  
 
9.  Culture 
Differing national cultures and norms of behavior affect day to day 
program operations.  Early effort is needed to build trust and 
understanding between participants.  This may seem trivial, but may 
make the difference between whether team members cooperate or fight.  
Nation A participants may be accustomed to rigid organizational control 
and individual conformance.  Nation B participants may be accustomed 
to a more relaxed approach.  Nation C participants may be accustomed 
to a greater degree of delegation of authority, … these considerations 
apply to any organized activity.  However, for international programs, the 
importance of getting along and working together is even higher because 
of the difficulty in resolving differences.  A problem between two 
individuals could be interpreted as a problem between two national 
partners, which ultimately might lead to one or more nations quitting the 
program.  Cultural differences are not only challenges for each 
individual, but also for each nation’s team. 
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C.  SYSTEM ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES    
1.  Overview   “Would you tell me, please, which way I 
ought to go from here?” 
“That depends a good deal on where  
you want to get to,”   said the Cat.   
“I don’t much care where ____”  said 
Alice.   
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you 
go,” said the Cat.   
“_____ so long as I get somewhere,”  
    Alice added as an explanation. 
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the 
Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”  
…  
Lewis Carroll, Alice in onderland,,1865
For a major undertaking, 
development complexity is enormous. 
Figure 6 suggests the magnitude of the 
effort. This system engineering review 
lays the foundation for the TMO 
framework definition that follows.   























Figure 6:  System Engineering Products and Processes (From Orin 
Marvel Lecture Notes) 
 
comprehensive presentation on system engineering; but rather, it is 
intended to provide a summary of basic system engineering principles, to 
support the later material.  
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2.  Development of Complex Systems 
System engineering has emerged as a discipline for managing 
development of complex systems.  The evolution of the discipline 
parallels the advancement of human civilization.  Social systems emerged 
with specialization such as food gathering, hunting, defense, leadership, 
etc.  The building of complex structures, such as houses, palaces, 
tunnels, pyramids, bridges and weapons resulted in specialization as 
well.  The processes may not have been thought of as system 
engineering, it was organized human activity in the struggle to survive.  
Yet, it was system engineering.  The methods used enabled development 
of systems that no one person could build or fully understand.  The 
differences are that now we have generalized the idea of system 
engineering, documented repeatable processes, increased specialization, 
and we now have automated tools to help us manage information.   
 
3.  Aspects of System Engineering 
Table 2 lists 30 aspects of system engineering.  For development of 
complex systems, many people are involved.  How they exchange 
information and make decisions impacts program success.     
Table 2:  System Engineering Considerations (from Howard Eisner) 
 
1.  Requirements:   
Needs/Goals/Objectives 
2.  Requirements:  Mission 
Engineering 
3.  Requirements 
Analysis/Allocation 
4.  Functional Analysis/Allocation 
5.  Architecture Design/Synthesis 
6.  Alternatives 
Analysis/Evaluation 
7.  Technical Performance 
Measurement (TPM) 
8.  Life Cycle Costing 
9.  Risk Analysis 
10.  Concurrent Engineering 
 
11.  Specification Development 
12.  Hardware/Software/Human 
Engineering 
13.  Interface Control 
14.  Computer Tool Evaluation 
and Utilization 
15. Technical Data Management 
16.  Integrated Logistics Support 
17.  Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability 
18.  Integration 
19.  Test and Evaluation 
20.  Quality Assurance and 
Management 
 
21.  Configuration Management 
22.  Specialty Engineering 
23.  PrePlanned Prod 
Improvement (P3I) 
24.  Training 
25.  Documentation 
26.  Production 
27.  Installation 
28.  Operations and Maintenance 
29.  Operations Evaluation/ 
Reengineering 
30.  Systems Engineering Mgmt 




4.  Evolution of System Engineering 
The understanding of system engineering principles has evolved.  
During the industrial revolution, Edison developed systems using new 
technologies involving electricity, acoustics and novel materials.  During 
his time there was no recognized system engineering discipline.  Yet he 
had to grapple with the issues embodied in table 2.  Edison understood 
the importance of good communications in industrial research and 
access to information and materials.  A library was central to his 
laboratory.  Also, he was a practical man.  He was once heard saying, 
“The most important part of an experimental laboratory is a big scrap 
heap.”   He understood the value of specialization and independent 
initiative: “Hell, there ain’t no rules here! We're trying to accomplish 
something!”  Work at his invention factory took no heed of the clock.  He 
gave workers a sense of shared identification with his goals (Millard).  
Yet, while Edison may have had an innate understanding of system 
engineering principles, his homegrown brew of methods was dependent 
on his personal genius and ability to inspire others.   Commonly 
accepted system engineering standards did not exist.    
 
5.  Psychology of System Engineering 
System engineering evolved because of a duality:  The human 
desire to survive coupled with human limitations.  Studies in psychology 
have shown that short-term memory is at the root of our creative 
abilities.  However, at one time we can retain only five to seven separate 
objects in our short-term memory.  Long term memory has much more 
capacity, however, it is slow and much less accurate.  These limitations 
can be overcome by organized cooperative efforts involving specialists.  
 People are able to know a lot about a few topics, or a little bit about a 
lot of topics.  For example, a neuro–opthemologist  knows a lot about 
eyes, the optic nerve and the visual cortex, but is unlikely to know much 
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about road construction.  
Knowledge can be deep or it 
can be wide. This is depicted 
in Figure 7.  
 
6.  System 
Engineering 
Standards  
System engineering is 
an organized approach to 
managing the development of 
complex systems.  
Standardized methodologies 
are captured in the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) standard IS-
632, and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
standard P1220.  These standards have their genesis in DOD Standard 
499.  The definition of system engineering from each of these standards 























Table 3:  System Engineering Definitions (From MIL STD 499A, 
EIA Standard IS-632 and IEEE Standard P1220)  
  MIL STD 499A, Engineering
Management (Now Cancelled)
  EIA Standard IS-632, Systems
Engineering
IEEE P1220, Standard for
Application and Management
of the Systems Engineering
Process
A logical sequence of activities and
decisions transforming an
operational need into a description
of system performance parameters
and a preferred system
configuration.
An interdisciplinary approach
encompassing the entire technical
effort, to evolve into and verify an
integrated and life cycle balanced set
of system people, products, and




derive, evolve and verify a life
cycle balanced systemsolution
which satisfies customer
expectations and meets public
acceptability.
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7.  Department of Defense View 
Figure 8 depicts the DOD system engineering process diagram.  In 
this diagram, a function called  “SE Anal & Cntrl”  is segregated from the 
other activities, intended to emphasize that analysis and control  
apply to each of the three  system engineering activities.  Verification is 
















       Loop
 
Figure 8:  DOD System Engineering Process 
 (From DSMC System Fundamentals) 
 
 Table 4 describes the system engineering activities shown in Figure 8. 
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Constraints Identified (such as 
environment) 
Functions Identified 
Applicable Standards Identified 
Ensure Testability 
Functional Analysis and Allocation 
Decomposition of Functions to lower level 
Define a functional architecture, which 
associates  the lower level functions 
Develop Interface Requirements for the 
functions 
Synthesis Validation and Verification 
Transform the functional architecture 
into alternative physical architectures 
Define candidate objects (physical    
  elements) for the system 
Do Trade studies to select the preferred  
  physical architecture and objects 
Define the physical interfaces 
Design the System 
Validation 
Requirements are correct and achievable 
Requirements have been satisfactorily 
  allocated 
Verification 
Design satisfies the requirements 
System is implemented according to the 
  design 
 
8.  Relationship of 
Requirements to Test 
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Dividing the system 
ineering process into sub-
cesses provides a means 
artition the larger 
cess into distinct, 
ageable inter-related 
cesses.  The V diagram, 
re 9, emphasizes the 
tionship between 
irements and test 
vities.  Looking at this 
ram it is easy to visualize 
effect of an error in system requirements, increasing  the need to do 
front work, such as modeling and simulation, to ensure system 


















Figure 9:  System Engineering “V” Diagram 
(From Orin Marvel Lecture Notes) 
  9.  Early Commitment of Resources 
The Committed versus 
Actuals diagram, Figure 10, 
highlights the effect of 
requirements and design 
decisions made early in a 
project.  What this diagram is 
showing is that decisions 
made early affect the work 
(and thus the cost) to be done 
later.  This provides further 
motivation to ensure the 
requirements are reasonable 
before initiating design and 
fabrication.   
$




Figure 10:  Committed vs Actuals (From 
Orin Marvel Lecture Notes) 
 
10.  Spiral Development   
For any system, improvements can be made over time.  This 
applies to all system aspects:  Requirements, design, fabrication, 
maintenance, training, etc.  Sometimes it is desirable to plan for 
improvement over time, especially if the system being developed is 
unfamiliar.  Figure 11 depicts a spiral development process where 
multiple iterations of system development occur.  The iterations are 
planned in advance, in recognition that it will not be possible obtain the 







Figure 11:  Spiral Development (From Jeffrey O. 
Grady) 
11.  Five Habits of a Successful Project 
Development of a major system is difficult, uncertain, requires 
creativity to overcome risk, and requires constant focus on essentials.  
Five habits of a successful project, based on lectures from Dr. Orin 
Marvel at the Naval Postgraduate School and writings from Grady Booch 
are listed in Table 5. 
Major system development involves complexity that must be 
managed.  The development team should work to one integrated set of  
requirements and processes.  A System Engineering Management Plan 
(SEMP) should be developed to form the basis for an overall project plan 
and integrated master schedule.  Risk should be evaluated and resources 
assigned accordingly to investigate alternative solutions.  Before large 
investments are made to develop complex solutions in hardware and 
software for the system or any level of subsystems, confidence should be 
gained through analysis, modeling, simulation and prototype  
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Table 5:  Five Habits of  a Successful Project (from Orin Marvel 
at the Naval Postgraduate School and writings from Grady 
Booch) 
 
1.  A ruthless focus on the development of a system that provides a well understood collection of 
essential minimal characteristics; 
 
2.  The existence of a culture that is centered on results, encourages communication and yet is not 
afraid to fail; 
 
3.  The effective use of modeling and simulation; 
 
4.  The existence of a strong architectural vision; 
 
5.  The existence of a well managed iterative and incremental life cycle. 
development.  Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) should be  
established early, to be used as metrics during the development effort, to 
track how well the design satisfies the requirements.      
 
12.  Organization 
The structure of a development organization, and communication 
processes within the organization are important to successful system 
development. Eisner suggests that a project organization should be 
headed by a project manager with the key subordinates of Chief System 
Engineer and Controller.  The program manager has overall 
responsibility for successful execution of the program, but his focus is 
primarily outward, with the goal of ensuring that customer needs are 
met.  The role of the chief system engineer is to coordinate efforts of all 
the engineers in the project to ensure that an optimal technical solution 
is achieved.  The role of the controller is to manage the business of the 
project such as contracts, schedules and finances.  He calls these three 
key project individuals the triumvirate, with overlapping responsibilities 
(Eisner pp 14-16, 24).  At lower levels, a program may be organized along 
product lines or by functions.  Participants may be dedicated to the 
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project or matrixed from a functional organization.  In any case, there is 
a mapping of skills to the defined system engineering process and the 
defined tasks.  For complex programs, formal coordination will be 
necessary.  However, informal communications is often the best way to 
foster creativity and innovation.      
System engineering involves a coordinated set of processes with 
engineering practitioners from a multitude of disciplines.  For a large 
project, no one person can know everything there is to know about the 
project.  This makes establishment of a clear system engineering process 
imperative.  Standards in use today that define tailorable processes for 
application to various programs.  Current standards are based on 
previous military standards.  Military standards for system engineering 
have been superceded by commercial standards.  Table 6 lists several 
system engineering standards and texts that are applicable to 
development of complex systems.     
Table 6:  Widely Used System Engineering Standards and Texts 
 
1.   EIA Standard IS – 632  System Engineering 
2.  IEEE P1220 Standard for Systems Engineering 
3.  MIL-STD-961D Defense Specifications 
4.  System Engineering Fundamentals, Defense Systems Management 
College (DSMC), 1999 
5.  System Engineering Management, Benjamin S. Blanchard, 1998 
6.  System Architecting, Eberhardt Rechtin, 1991 
7.  System Validation and Verification, Jeffrey O. Grady 




























III.  TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK 
 
A.  TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 
This chapter defines Technical Management Oversight (TMO) and 
the framework that will be used in chapter IV to characterize TMO for 
several international Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).   
TMO is technical management, from the customer perspective.  It 
helps the customer to get his/her “money’s worth.”  Creating a new 
system requires partnership between the prime contractor engineers and 
the customer TMO.  The TMO activity defines the work to be performed 
and the system to be built, then certifies that the system developed 
meets the needs of the Users.  The prime contractor, with direct control 
of scientists, engineers and technicians,  will create a system where no 
system existed before.  For complex programs, risk may be shared and 
there may be a degree of collaboration between the customer and the 
prime contractor. However, the prime contractor remains responsible for 
producing the system, and the TMO activity remains responsible to verify 
that the technical performance requirements have been met.  
Looking to prime contractor development, TMO involves system 
engineering, but not the same system engineering that is done by the 
prime contractor.  Section B of this chapter describes a TMO framework 
is be used to highlight TMO activities that are central to Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and that may be used for understanding 
TMO for international programs.  Looking outward, the international 
customers must be convinced of program success.  From the U.S. 
perspective, the U.S. acquisition process must be satisfied in order to 
continue into the next acquisition phase.   
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B.  FRAMEWORK 
A framework for describing TMO is shown in Figure 12.  The 
framework includes the U.S. acquisition review process in the context of 
an international program.  Although equally important, the acquisition 
review processes for partner nations is not included as part of this thesis.  
This limitation allows focus on the U.S. aspects of TMO for an 
international MDAP and limits the scope of the thesis.  
Technical Management
Oversight
                             










Control of and Access to Technical Data
User Participation (HFE Studies, Etc)
Cost Share/Work Share Affecting TMO















C.  TMO CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  TMO Organizational Aspects 
TMO Organizational Aspects represent the external and internal 
organization considerations that affect TMO for the activity.  Externally, 
the relationship of the International Program Office to its national 
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sponsors is described.  Internally, the IPO organization structure is 
described.   
 
2.  Research Development and Engineering Center 
(RDEC)/Contractor Technical Support  
RDEC/Contractor Technical Support is the technical support 
obtained from external sources to help develop system requirements, to 
help develop contract statements of work, to evaluate contractor 
performance, to evaluate technical suitability of specifications and 
designs, to facilitate transfer of new technologies to help the customer be 
a smart buyer. This technical support is independent of the prime 
contractor.  Technical support may be obtained from an agency of a 
partner nations, from a contracted source, or a combination of these 
sources.  This support provides an extension of the program 
management activity. The TMO framework includes technical support 
because technical support plays a large role in the execution and 
oversight of U.S. MDAPs, and it is important to understand the 
uniqueness of technical support for international MDAPs. 
 
3.  Effective Management of Technical Requirements  
Effective management of  technical requirements is critical to all 
acquisition programs.  For a domestic U.S. MDAP, program requirements 
begin with the User’s ORD.  Typically, a U.S. Program Management Office 
(PMO) will translate the ORD into a contract technical requirements 
document that becomes part of a development contract.  For 
international MDAPs, the process for management of top level 
requirements will vary from program to program. 
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4.  Management of Technical Risk  
Management of technical risk is critical to all acquisition programs.  
In simple terms, every opportunity requires identifying anything that can 
cause a program to fail and then doing something about it.  In practice, 
risk management may involve selection of contractors with proven track 
records for successfully developing systems, identification of technology 
risks, establishment of Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) for 
monitoring technical risk, identification of process risks, establishment 
of process metrics, and monitoring of risk throughout the program.  The 
manner that any program manages technical risk will have a large 
impact on the success of a program that involves significant technical 
risk. 
 
5.  Technical Monitoring Capability 
The technical monitoring capability of a program office will impact 
the ability to effectively manage a program.  It has been stated for control 
systems that you cannot control what you cannot measure.  A “good” 
contractor will have internal controls and be able to manage effectively.  
however, as long as people have self interest, we should not assume the 
contractor will look out after Government/International Partner 
interests.  Some level of technical monitoring is necessary. 
 
6.  Direct Technical Contribution  
There are times in a program when a Government/IPO person 
must make a direct technical contribution.  This may occur in a variety 
of circumstances.  If a requirement cannot be met, a Government/IPO 
engineer may need to help identify an achievable and meaningful 
requirement.  The Government/IPO engineer may be aware of 
technologies that may provide solutions to intractable problems.  If the 
system must interface with other systems, the Government/IPO engineer 
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may have to help work out a mutually agreeable change to an existing 
interface. In some cases the Government/IPO engineers may be in a 
better position than the contractor to identify existing solutions that can 
be either directly incorporated into the MDAP or modified and included, 
leading to cost savings.  Government/IPO review of proposed designs 
may identify flaws based on experience with other systems. 
 
7.  Control of and Access to Technical Data 
Effective control of and access to technical data by 
contractor/IPO/ Government personnel is important to the success of 
the program.  Without configuration control, any MDAP involving 
millions of components and millions of software lines of code is a 
disaster.  For the purpose of configuration management, a computer 
based technical data repository may be used with clearly defined access 
and change authorizations.  A sound configuration management plan is 
essential. 
Another aspect related to control and access to technical data has 
to do with company or Government ownership of data.  A company may 
consider certain data to be competition sensitive and may not want to 
share that data.  Governments may consider certain data to be militarily 
sensitive, and may not want to share the information with other 
countries for fear of losing tactical or strategic military advantage.   
Different approaches can be taken to sharing country or company 
proprietary data.  One approach is to allow open access to all information 
by all program personnel (assuming a reasonable need to know).  If 
multiple companies are involved, this might not be palatable because of 
company desires to protect proprietary information.  Sometimes the U.S. 
is reluctant to share all technical details with its partners in areas where 
the U.S. has a perceived significant technological lead.  Contractors are 
often reluctant to share information with the Government/IPO, perhaps 
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due to fear of Government interference.  How effective an international 
MDAP is at sharing necessary information can have a large influence on 
the success of the program. 
 
8.  User Participation  
User participation may be desired during the early design stages of 
an MDAP, particularly for defining details of Human System Integration 
(HSI) interfaces.  The system must be designed to meet the extremes of 
human weight, size, shape, strength and intelligence that is required.  
HSI studies are often useful to help determine optimal switch 
configurations, responses to audible alert signals and computer display 
appearance.   
 
9.  Cost Share and Work Share 
In addition to affecting prime contractor work plans and allocation 
of resources, cost share and work share may have an effect on TMO.  
This may affect access/utilization of independent Hardware in the Loop 
and other simulation facilities, interoperability facilities, and test 
facilities.  This may also affect access to technical support.   
 
10.  Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW)  
Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW) is a primary 
responsibility of the technical management activity within many program 
management offices.   The resulting SOW becomes the effective Bible for 
all technical work performed under the contract by the contractor and for 
TMO interactions with the contractor.  Required deliverables and 
activities will affect the nature of TMO for the duration of the contract.   
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D.  PROGRAM FEEDBACK AND INPUTS AFFECTING TMO 
1.  International Executive Control  
International executive control is accomplished by an international 
board of directors consisting of senior members of the acquisition 
community of each nation.  Collectively the group will be chartered to 
oversee the IPO and make executive decisions that are outside of the 
authority of the IPO.  Although not fully accurate, this international 
executive control activity has been likened to the DOD, for an 
international program.   
 
2.  TMO Funding 
For the purpose of this paper, TMO funding is the funding for the 
IPO engineering staff, the funding for IPO technical support, and the 
funding applied independently by each partner nation for engineering 
staff and for technical support. 
 
3.  National Interaction 
National interaction is the interactions between the IPO and the 
national authorities and bureaucracies.  Although figure 5 suggests an 
isolation of the IPO from international processes, coordination must 
occur between the IPO and the host nations.  Requirements must be 
agreed upon.  Changes must be coordinated.  Test facilities must be 
arranged.  Contract SOWs must be developed and agreed upon.  The 
degree to which each nation becomes involved in these activities external 
to the IPO will be determined by each nation, led by the respective 
steering committee member. 
 
4.  U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program Phase  
For continuation of an MDAP, there must be a U.S. Acquisition 
Review Prior to the Next Program Phase.  This applies to international 
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MDAPs as well as domestic MDAPs.   What is different between an 
international MDAP and a domestic MDAP is the tailoring of DOD 5000 
requirements.  The mandates of an international MDAP are determined 
by the international Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which is 
developed considering the national laws and regulations of all partner 
nations.  DOD 5000 does not necessarily apply!  However, for U.S. 
participation in an international MDAP to continue, a decision must be 
made to continue.  DOD 5000 is intended to be tailored, however, the 
U.S. DOD acquisition community does not have a lot of experience with 




IV.  TMO FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
 
A.  HAWK  
Information about the HAWK program has been primarily obtained 
from an interview with Mr. John Robins who was the civilian Deputy 
Program Manager for Hawk.  Extensive excerpts have been made from 
this interview.  While this may not be normal practice, Mr. Robins words 
speak for themselves. 
 
1.  Overview 
HAWK is an Air Defense System first developed by the U.S. Army 
in the 1950s 
and then sold to 
and or produced 









U.S. Military no 
longer uses 
HAWK, the 
system is still in 
use by other 
countries.  Key components of HAWK are continuous wave and pulse 
acquisition radars for low to medium range target acquisition; a 
 




command post for Command and Control (C2) functions, 
communications and data processing; the HAWK missile; and the 
launcher.   The HAWK system has been involved in conflicts during the 
last several decades including the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam 
War, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and the Persian Gulf war.  
Threat targets include fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, cruise 
missiles and short range ballistic missiles 
(http://www.raytheon.com/es/esproducts/dsshawk/dsshawk.htm). 
 
2.  Application of the TMO Framework  
a.  TMO Considerations 
 Table 7 captures the TMO framework elements for HAWK. 
 




1.  TMO 
Organizational 
Aspects 
HAWK was developed by the U.S. Army and was later sold to other 
countries as a completed product or as a data package that would 
enable foreign production.  U.S. project office personnel coordinated 
with foreign counterparts for sales and setting up production lines, 
The HAWK PM office was staffed with U.S. personnel. 




HAWK technical support included in-house technical support from 
the Government Program Management Office (PMO), from the Army 
Missile Command (MICOM) RDEC and from expert technical 





Stable requirements and design were important for the HAWK 
program, especially after the beginning of international co-
production and international sales. An effort was made to minimize 
change of the international technical data package that was a 
directly result of difficulties managing change in an international 
environment. 
42 








Management of Technical Risk for HAWK was affected by 
international program participation in that when technical problems 
were discovered, there was a danger of international finger pointing 
to assign blame for any particular problem.  When problems were 
discovered, the U.S. State Department might get involved and the 
process of identifying the problem and subsequently solving the 
problem might become clouded in international politics.  
Management of technical risk was more difficult because of the 
additional external scrutiny resulting from the international 
participation. 
5.  Technical 
Monitoring 
Capability 
Technical Monitoring Capability for HAWK was not overtly 
influenced by international participation, because the U.S. HAWK 
development activity did not involve international participation.  The 
TMO activity within the U.S. HAWK PMO monitored contractor 
performance independent of international considerations.   Use was 
made of internal HAWK PMO technical support, the RDEC, and if 
warranted, independent expert technical consultants. 
6.  Direct 
Technical 
Contribution 
During production, a conscious effort was made to minimize change 
to the international technical data package because of the concern 
for upsetting a fragile relationship.  This had an effect on any 
contributions made by TMO personnel.  However, during 
development, the direct technical contributions of TMO personnel 
were not influenced by international considerations.  The goals of 
TMO were as follows: 
(1)  Ensure users requirements are clearly stated in a system spec 
(2)  Monitor the performance of the contractor development effort 
with intermediate technical milestones 
(3)  Do root cause analysis when a problem is discovered Don’t let 
the contractor just keep testing and trying to fix the problem until 
the problem is fully understood. 
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7.  Control of 
and Access to 
Technical Data 
Control of and Access to Technical Data was not an issue for HAWK 
development.  Export decisions were made regarding the technical 
data package for independent international production and export 
of the completed HAWK systems.  Export decisions also had to be 
made regarding individual HAWK upgrades.  However, because the 
development activity was under the sole control of the U.S. Army, 
Foreign Release of information from other systems or involving 
advanced research or detailed algorithms was not required.  When 
upgrades were made as a result of sensitive intelligence information, 
the system upgrade was developed, perhaps a vulnerability was 
eliminated.  A system upgrade was published, and customers could 
buy them, however, nothing was published identifying the technical 
details of the change, and in the case of vulnerability related 
changes, nothing was published describing the vulnerability that 
was being addressed.  Thus, the problem of obtaining approvals to 
release information was minimized by limiting the information 
released to the minimum necessary to use the system or to 
manufacture the system. 
8.  User 
Participation 
User Participation for HAWK development involved the U.S. Army 
user, and there are no international considerations for HAWK user 
participation.   
9.  Cost Share 
and Work 
Share 
Cost Share and Work Share did not become an issue for HAWK 
development because HAWK was developed by and for the U.S. 
Army.  When upgrades were developed after international 
production and sales had begun, HAWK owners were given 
opportunity to purchase the upgrades and to provide funding to 
create the upgrade (as in the MTBF upgrade of the radar described 





Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW) did not involve 
international negotiations or special international considerations. 
 
b. TMO Program Feedback Considerations 
Table 8 captures the TMO Program Feedback framework 










1.  International 
Executive 
Control 
International Executive Control  did not apply to HAWK. 
2.  TMO 
Funding 
There were no international considerations for HAWK development 
TMO funding.  The HAWK PMO was managed by U.S. personnel and 
TMO personnel were U.S. people. 
3.  National 
Interaction 
National Interaction  for HAWK was limited to coordination related 
to purchasing of complete HAWK missile systems, the technical data 
package and/or individual system upgrades.  There were no joint 
decision processes that were dependent on agreement of all parties 
to move forward with the program.  There was pressure to minimize 
change to the HAWK technical data package, which minimized even 
further the international coordination required. 
4.  US 
Acquisition 
Review prior to 
next phase 
U.S. acquisition review for HAWK was consistent with other U.S. 
managed programs.  This was possible because the HAWK program 
was controlled by a U.S. PMO and the HAWK program was U.S. 
controlled. 
 
3.  Elaboration 
a. Example: The Value Of HAWK Technical Support 
When serious technical problems arise in a program, often 
the contractor, TMO personnel and perhaps even RDEC personnel are 
too close to the problem or lack the expertise to establish the root cause 
of the problem.  Sometimes it is necessary to bring in outside 
consultants.  At key points in development and during production the 
cost may be easily justified.  Making the right technical decision may 
have a major influence on capability and cost through the life of the 
fielded system and a delay in production will be costly.  An experience 
highlighting the importance of outside technical consultants and good 
TMO analysis involved HAWK missiles that exploded prematurely during 
test firings due to faulty rocket motors.   
Successful HAWK production had been ongoing for several 
years.  HAWK was at maximum production.  There were 22 
countries involved in production or as buyers.  Japan was 
co-producing and NATO had a big co-production group.  
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They were in production on their own.  Others were buying 
from us. Lord knows, Iran had more HAWKs than we did!  
Now, when we discuss HAWK, we are talking about more 
than just the system.  There are training facilities and test 
facilities, and the who thing.  At one time 60% of the people 
at Redstone worked in some way on the HAWK program.  
Aerojet had come up with a HAWK motor which is real 
clever.  It used a case bonded propellant that is cast in one 
piece, and it worked!  All around the world we were 
production thousands per month.  During lot qualification 
testing at Aerojet, one blew up.  It was determined that the 
problem was related to de-bonding of the propellant.  The 
contractor wanted to just scrub the lot and produce another 
without further analysis, but we said no, let’s look at another 
lot. … We had the same problem with the other lot.  We 
immediately froze the lots we considered suspect.   
Now, you’ve got 22 countries involved, including the NATO 
consortium and they are saying, ‘It’s your fault, you have 
changed the technical data package.’  We are talking about 
lots of motors, We had the same problem of de-bonding!  We 
then froze the lots we thought were suspect.  Now you’ve got 
22 countries including  the NATO consortium. and they are 
saying, … ‘It’s your fault.  We are using your technical data 
package and You’ve changed the data package.’  Then, next 
thing you know, their missiles start blowing up.  So it was 
our fault.  We are talking about lots of motors, lots of people, 
lots of nations.  You get the state department involved. 
This is a little problem, if you only had the U.S. involved.  
You’d get in and work the problem. It’s a good problem to 
solve.   But when you get the state dept. involved, you don’t 
have time to swat the knats that are going around.  Well, you 
know, we get back to basics here.  There is no sense in 
hacking on this thing until we find out what the problem is.   
Of course Aerojet already had a fix.  We said, no, were going 
to introduce you to a subject called root cause analysis.  You 
may say ‘that’s ridiculous,  . I can take you the Raytheon, 
Aerojet, Lincoln, Vought, just about every contractor I have 
dealt with and they are all the same.  I mean, it’s their 
nature, [they want to jump to the solution before 
understanding the problem.]  Anyway, we put a root cause 
team at aerojet.  And I said, one of the people we want to find 
is a chemical engineer who has worked there for a while, but 
who is retired.  I talked to the president of Aerojet, and he 
agreed to help.  You know the Navy used this motor too.  I 
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said, ‘you don’t know where the end of this thing is.’  
Fortunately in HAWK we had the production lots bounded 
that we thought were affected.  Well, we found this fellow 
and we put him on our root cause team.  We took our best 
engineers and put them on the team.  The review team came 
in as often as needed to say how they are doing and their 
status and what they new and presented the information.  
This older fellow says, ‘Where did you get that data?’  ‘We got 
it from so and so down in Aerojet.’ ‘ Don’t believe him, he’s 
not trustworthy.’  It turned out, the source of the data was 
giving bad data!  And we went and found out that this guy 
had and changed a process.  …  Now he went in and 
changed the process for bonding, and made that sucker de-
bond.  His procedure wasn’t’ written up. He just went on the 
line and changed it.  It was legal, but not documented.  He 
never checked it out, but he changed the process.  We found 
that out and we made a motor with that process and it blew 
up.  We made one with the original process and it didn’t blow 
up.  The original problem was solved (June 21, 2001 
Interview with John Robins) . 
 
b.  Example:  International Interaction 
There were other problems with HAWK missiles blowing up.  
Overseas, the international co-production teams needed help identifying 
their problems.  Additional international considerations for use of 
technical consultants emerged.  As the example continues, it becomes 
clear that for programs involving international participation, it is 
important to respect national pride and the uniqueness of different 
cultures. 
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…  and so we then sent the team of people oversees to find 
out why they were having problems.  We sent our 
consultants over there, with an explosives expert, one who 
gets involved when cotton gins blow up and things like that.   
He went where the French were making the motor.  So we 
went in and said we’ll find out what’s going on.  Understand 
that this motor needs to be made in an environmentally 
controlled facility.  This whole motor de-bonding problem is 
related to moisture.  And you know how sensitive the French 
are and the kind of courtesy and diplomacy you need in 
dealing with these people.  Well, consultants don’t worry 
about these things.  You ask them to see what the problem 
is, … I’ll never forget, we almost had a war over there.  This 
group went in to check this facility that is supposed to be 
environmentally controlled, and they look, and, … in the exit 
interview, the on site people and the managers are informed 
about the findings.  The consultant said, ‘how in hell can 
you say this is environmentally controlled, I saw a rat come 
through that door!’  There were gales of silence from Europe.  
We went for 3 years and never made a change in the 
technical data package because of that.  Because if there 
was any change in the technical data package they would 
say  ‘it is your problem’  (June 21, 2001 interview with John 
Robins). 
 
c. Example:  Direct Technical Contribution   
An example of a direct technical contribution on the HAWK 
program from TMO personnel is described below: 
In the HAWK program, they had a radar.   I was new on the 
program.  I wanted to know, what is the worst Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF) part.  What is the highest repair 
part cost.  In HAWK the radar to be operational 24 hr day 
360 days per year, with a 27 hour MTB!  Those people [the 
soldiers] were in trouble, struggling to make this thing keep 
working.  We considered initiating a value program. The 
HAWK radar is a wonderful piece of equipment, with tubes, 
that was impossible to maintain.  We spent as much 
international money as we could get in an effort to improve 
the MTBF to 150 Hours.  We put up both international 
money and US money to develop the improvement.  One of 
the quantified Mile Stones we established was ‘You will make 
3 of these.  You will take parts of A, B and C and exchange 
the parts and make them work.’  Raytheon was able to make 
the first system work as required with some special effort.   
They were able to make the second system work too.  
However, it became apparent that fundamental difficulties 
were being encountered that were not being solved. It was 
not possible to interchange the parts of the different systems 
and expect them to operate.  We sent two of Dr. McCorkle’s 
young radar engineers from the MICOM RDEC, Mike 
McFahee and George O’Reilly,  to monitor the development 
activity.  They were young, but they were good.  I knew there 
would be technical problems [improving the MTBF], I just 
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didn’t know where they would be.  We had high power tubes 
near low power sensitive electronics.  I said, ‘I smell 
something bad going on down there, will you go and see?’  
They came back and said, with a lot of tweaking they got one 
to work, then with even more tweaking they got the second 
unit to work.   They said ‘There is not a snowballs chance in 
hades they will be able to swap those parts and make them 
work.’  But the contractor wouldn’t admit it, because we’re 
talking a lot of money.  The contractor did not want to hear 
about it.  I told them, talk to my guys, and if they are wrong, 
convince them.  Listen to them too.  … Next thing I know, 
Raytheon came and tried to convince me.  But it was just 
handling.  I told them, ‘you’ve got a quantified milestone that 
requires you to be able to interchange the parts.’  Well they 
went to the MICOM commanding general, and to the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), … but I had my experts that 
I believed.  The Raytheon guys look down on you but they 
don’t help.  This was around Christmas time. I issued a stop 
work order.  Raytheon had never been subject to a stop work 
order.  They said, ‘You can’t do that.’   I said, talk to the 
contracting officer.  You‘ve got 90 days.  They said, ‘What 
can we do?’  Well, they called in Peter Swerling, who invented 
Swerling 1 and Swerling 2 for radars, a famous radar person.  
But the best were McCorkle’s guys.   The fact is, they even 
have their own company now called Phase 4.  They found the 
problem and suggested how Raytheon could fix it.  Raytheon 
had 90 days to fix it and they did.  We were close to 
terminating.  But we got a radar that had 175 hr MTBF (21 
June, 2001 Interview with John Robins). 
 
 
B.  ROLAND 
Information about the ROLAND program has been primarily 
obtained from an interview with Mr. John Robins who was the civilian 
Program Manager for ROLAND.  Extensive excerpts have been made from 
this interview.  While this may not be normal practice, Mr. Robins words 
speak for themselves. 
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1.  Overview 
 
Figure 14:  ROLAND Missile Firing (from 
http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/ 
roland/summary.html) 
Figure 14 depicts 
the firing of a ROLAND 
missile.  The US 
ROLAND missile is a 
short range, low-
altitude, all-weather, 
Army air defense 
artillery surface-to-air 
missile system which is 
based upon the Franco-






2.  Application 
of the TMO Framework  
a.  TMO Considerations 
Table 9 captures the TMO framework elements for ROLAND. 
 
 




1.  TMO 
Organizational 
Aspects 
The U.S. ROLAND program was a production program that was 
based on a European system, ROLAND III.  ROLAND III was 
developed by a consortium of European countries.  Compared to the 
HAWK program, ROLAND was a reverse situation.  At the time the 
U.S. became involved, the European ROLAND office included six 
European countries headed by a French general. 
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RDEC/Contractor Technical Support included in-house technical 
support from the Government Program Management Office (PMO), 
from the Army Missile Command (MICOM) RDEC and from expert 





Hughes and Boeing, had to obtain the technical data package for 
the ROLAND air defense system and then integrate ROLAND with 
U.S. Honest John Trucks, which did not initially satisfy the 





Management of Technical Risk for the U.S. ROLAND program was 
focused on the implementation by U.S. contractors of technology 
developed in Europe.  However, some technical aspects of the 
system had to be improved in order to improve reliability and 
simplify the use of the system.  One of the risks had to do with the 
reliability and calibration of the radar.  This risk was uncovered 
during user testing. 
5.  Technical 
Monitoring 
Capability 
Technical Monitoring Capability for ROLAND was not overtly 
influenced by international participation, because the U.S. ROLAND 
development activity consisted of U.S. contractors producing an 
existing system from a technical data package supplied by the 
European consortium. The TMO activity within the U.S. ROLAND 
PMO monitored contractor performance independent of 
international considerations.   Use was made of technical support 
within the HAWK PMO office, the MICOM RDEC, and when 
warranted, independent expert technical consultants. 
6.  Direct 
Technical 
Contribution 
There was little opportunity for direct technical contribution by U.S 
ROLAND TMO personnel due to the nature of the program.  
However, as with TMO for all U.S. programs, the focus and concern 
needs to be for the system to satisfy the User’s needs.  Two U.S. 
ROLAND activities can be called direct technical contributions:  The 
safe and effective integration of the Honest John trucks into 
ROLAND.  The upgrade of the ROLAND radar to simplify operations 
and to minimize calibration. 
7.  Control of 
and Access to 
Technical Data 
Control of and Access to Technical Data was not an issue for 
ROLAND.  Transfer of the technical data package from the 
European developers was arranged by Hughes Corporation and 
Boeing Corporation.  
8.  User 
Participation 
User participation for the U.S. ROLAND production was limited to 
test.  The interests of the user were of paramount concern for U.S. 
ROLAND TMO, and resulted in a truck improvement and a radar 
improvement. 
9.  Cost Share 
and Work 
Share 
Cost Share and Work Share did not directly apply to the U.S. 
ROLAND program and had no bearing on TMO.   
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Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW)  was a critical 
activity for U.S. ROLAND TMO, however, due to the existing 
technical data package, the SOWs primarily addressed production.  
There were no international considerations for development of these 
statements of work. 
 
 
b. TMO Program Feedback Considerations 
Table 10 captures the TMO Program Feedback elements for 
ROLAND. 
 








International Executive Control did not apply to the U.S. ROLAND 
program.  
2.  TMO 
Funding 
TMO Funding was provided by the U.S. and there were no direct 
international considerations.  ROLAND development was essentially 
complete prior to the U.S. becoming involved and did reduce cost 
risk, although, there was an effort to either eliminate the program or 
to reduce the cost of the U.S. ROLAND program by one half. The 
ROLAND international agreements may have motivated congress to 
insist that funding be maintained. 
3.  National 
Interaction 
Following program initiation, there was no significant national 
interaction between U.S. Government personnel and European 
personnel.  The burden for international coordination fell on Hughes 
and Boeing personnel, at the technical level and with European 
contractor counterparts. Liaison was maintained with the European 
ROLAND program office by the U.S. ROLAND program office, 
however, this had no significant impact on TMO.   
4.  US 
Acquisition 
Review prior to 
next phase 
U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program Phase.  The U.S. 
ROLAND Program went directly to production and there was no 
follow-on acquisition phase and thus no acquisition review prior to 




3.  Elaboration 
a.  Discussion:  ROLAND International Organization 
The U.S. ROLAND program was a production program that 
was based on a European system, ROLAND III.  ROLAND III was 
developed by a consortium of European countries.  Compared to the 
HAWK program, ROLAND was a reverse situation.  At the time the U.S. 
became involved, the European ROLAND office included six European 
countries headed by a French general who dressed in Civilian Clothes.  
ROLAND was supplied by the 6 nation European consortium 
and the U.S. hired Boeing and Hughes.  They had to make 
the arrangements for the data package to come to them.  The 
reason for U.S. involvement in ROLAND was cooperation in 
international sales.  They developed it and we produced it 
over here.  In the case of HAWK, it was developed over here 
and produced over there.  For ROLAND, we didn’t buy 
systems from them, we just took the ROLAND data package, 
cobbled it up and made something (21 June 2001 Interview 
with John Robins.) 
 The European consortium had their office in Paris, and we 
had a Liaison officer.  The work environment was different 
from the work environment we are accustomed to in the U.S.   
Never get there before 10:00 a.m.  … you would always leave 
by 2:00 p.m.  Never call anyone at home, always leave before 
Friday at noon, always very formal.  French people are very 
different. … I also had to admire the people in the office.  
Many of them spoke fluently 6 languages.  They put us to 
shame.  They never argued.  They always listened.  They 
would take in and they would negotiate.  They were shrewd 
negotiators.     (June 21 2001 Interview with John Robins). 
 
b.  ROLAND Example:  Management of Requirements 
I guess the best I ever felt. … I was one of the early civilian 
product managers.  I was called at 10:00 pm and was told 
that I needed to see the vice chief of staff of the army in 
Washington  and tell him why my program cost so much.  
And so I went out the next morning, opened my safe and got 
some stuff out, got on the Redstone Rocket and flew into 
Washington and got in a taxi and went into the Pentagon.  
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I’ll tell you, those people, … when the vice chief wants to see 
you, you go through layers real fast.  They were pushing me 
into his office and set me down in the hot seat.  There were 
all the generals and friends, I thought they were my friends, 
and they set me down in the hot seat in front of the Vice 
Chief of Staff.  He looked at me, and I said, you asked me to 
come and I’m here.  The problem was that we were going to 
deploy ROLAND with the New Mexico National Guard.  The 
intention was for the National Guard to deploy anywhere in 
the world  within 24 hours and protect airfields and so forth.  
Looking at it, it was real clear what it was going to take to 
keep the system certified and viable.   …  He said, ‘Cut your 
program cost in half and you’ve got a program.’  And I just 
said, … ‘Sir, if it is cut, the Army can’t afford this program.  
I’m your manager, and I’ll be glad to cancel it for you.’  
People were crawling under tables, and, …. you don’t talk to 
the vice chief of Army that way.  I said, ‘Sir we don’t want to 
give the troops junk.’  I said, ‘I have looked at this program 
and I know how important it is to keep costs down.  But I 
also know that if I can’t put these, … you’ve got these 20 
year old honest john trucks you got em mounted on, and if I 
can’t put jake brakes on these trucks and etc to keep them 
safe, because I’ve seen the trucks come off the hills in Korea 
with HAWK loads on them.  The ROLAND load is bigger than 
HAWK loads, … then we’re going to lose troops.’  I said, 
‘We’ve got to maintain the system so that it works.’  Also, I 
said, ‘We found out that if you don’t train the troops , …’ we 
had a trainer just for training then we had a mini trainer 
that was out, then we found out on a curve how many days 
they could stay out without losing their skill, it was 90 days, 
and you could just see it, it was like driving too long.  I said, 
its true, we just can’t deploy this system if you can’t support 
it.  And I’m not trying to say, …, I’m your manager.  If the 
money is there, I’ll be glad to deploy it.  If it’s not, you tell me 
and I’ll terminate it.  I’m the manager to run what you want.  
I’m not just to put it out there, and I’ll do that if the money is 
there.  But if the money doesn’t fit, I’m the manager to 
terminate it.’  Oh, I’ll tell you, …  I went home, and I got all 
the people together, that were working so hard, …, we were 
just before deploying it, and I called civilian personnel and I 
told them, ‘I don’t know what is going to happen.’  The funny 
thing was that the vice chief then went over to the senate 
and said, ‘I have cut these things down, including ROLAND.’  
And all I had said to my people in Washington was ‘you send 
me a message to tell me to terminate and I’ll terminate.’  Well 
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he went over to the senate and said he wanted to terminate, 
ok and the chairman of the Armed Services Committee said, 
‘We like your suggestions except for one, and that is that we 
don’t want you to termination ROLAND.’  Now ROLAND is 
just a little pea in all that stuff up there. … And so they 
couldn’t send me a message to terminate, and we were held 
in this little purgatory here.  And so finally it got to the point 
where the contractor said we’ll keep working without any 
money. … and I said, no you won’t.    And so I sent a 
message back, …. Barring the fact that I don’t have the 
money to continue and it’s against law so and so to let the 
contractor train troops, support, etc, I plan to terminate on 
such and such a day if we don’t receive the money.’   Well, 
about 48 hours before the end of the time period, the money 
came.  We deployed ROLAND (June 21, 2001 Interview with 
John Robins).  
 
c.  ROLAND Example:  Management of Technical Risk 
One of the risks had to do with the reliability and calibration 
of the radar.  This risk was uncovered during user testing: 
 They were ready, … they had been producing for a year 
when I was sent to ROLAND.  I went in and they were about 
to start the engineering user test.  Production had been 
going for a year and they hadn’t even done the test yet.  I 
said I guess we better start.  We had a Captain at White 
Sands.  They had all these spare parts, and he said how 
good it was and what good results they’d been having.  And 
so, I had to get a test manager for ROLAND.  He was 
someone I knew and trusted,  and he was someone I knew I 
could work with.  I saw that was what was going to do it.  
Then he [my test manager] said, everything’s looking so 
good, what your going to do is have a system test.  Take the 
hardware, the spare parts and you’ve got the manuals.  I told 
the Captain, operate from the test plan, and I want you to 
use the manual.  If have to depart from the manual, don’t do 
it and then tell me, just write it down and say, this doesn’t 
work.  If it’s not in the manual, these troops won’t have 
someone around to help them.  Well it turned out, they went 
out and the next thing they couldn’t do anything.  They 
couldn’t hit anything and couldn’t even fire.  And the 
contractor was saying, ‘But we did it, and hey, you won’t let 
us do this!’  We did a root cause analysis to find out what 
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was going on. It turns out the contractor had been  doing 
tests on their own to let us know how good the system was.  
They were out there calibrating the radar with the $1.5M 
spare part, and they were calibrating that radar with an 
elaborate machine while the drone was in the air.  Then they 
would move from the calibration to the drone and shoot 
down the drone.  Well, the operating procedures said you 
only do this calibration once every three months.  This 
captain dutifully had followed procedures, and they said, ‘No 
you’ve got to calibrate it.’ The captain said, ‘No, you only do 
it once every three months.’  It turned out the thing went out 
of calibration and wouldn’t shoot a thing!  They had to go in 
and make a major change so that it wouldn’t go out of 
calibration.  But it wouldn’t have been any good to the troops 
otherwise.   
It comes back to a simple thing that is true whether the 
program is international or not.  You are trying to certify to 
the troops that the system will work the way that it is 
advertised.  That is the first time that Hughes had been 
through one of MICOMs root cause analysis.  They learned a 
lot.  
International is more complex Their test ranges are set much 
like ours but they use different equipment.  Many times 
there are quirks in the test range that you don’t find until 
you start testing, that will invalidate the test.  These are 
things the TMO needs to be sensitive to.  Many times it is the 
Italian or French ombudsman on the team that will have to 
go back and tell their folks that they are messing up. [And 
this is potentially embarrassing to the country, and so 
communications becomes important] (21 June 2001 
Interview with John Robins). 
 
C.  LANCE 
Information about the Lance program has been primarily obtained 
from an interview with Mr. John Robins who was the civilian Manager for 
Lance.   While Lance did not involve significant international 
participation during development, the TMO lessons learned have merit. 
 
56 
1.  Overview 
Figure 15 depicts the LANCE missile and launcher.  LANCE was a 
mobile field artillery tactical missile system used to provide both nuclear 
and non-nuclear fire-support to the Army.  It was designed to attack key 
enemy targets beyond the range of cannon artillery.  It was a highly 
mobile, medium-range, fin stabilized, all weather, surface-to-surface 
missile weapon system. LANCE’s primary mission targets were enemy 
missile firing positions, airfields, transportation centers, command and 
logistic installations, critical terrain features (defiles, bridgeheads, main 
supply routes, etc.), and large troop concentrations.  
 
Figure 15:  LANCE MISSILE (from 
http://www.redstone.army.mil/lance/summary.html) 
 
The missile was incrementally guided using the Directional Control 
Automatic Meteorological (DCAM) compensation concept. The LANCE 
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missile was launched by a high thrust booster that propelled it out to 
1500 meters. The boost phase direction was controlled by a gyro 
commanding secondary injection into the booster. The booster cut off 
and the variable thrust sustainer, controlled by an accelerometer, 
provided the exact amount of thrust to equal the missile drag. The result 
was a predictable trajectory that essentially eliminated errors caused by 
atmospheric disturbances or changes. The missile was aimed using field 
artillery techniques plus the variable booster time. Unlike other Army 
missiles that use solid propellants, the LANCE used a prepackaged, 
liquid fuel that eliminated any need for fueling in the field and gave 
LANCE a short reaction time. It was capable of delivering nuclear 
warheads to a range of 75 miles and conventional warheads to a range of 
45 miles.   
LANCE was actively deployed until the early 1990s. In 1991, 
President George Bush announced a  unilateral cut in nuclear weapons, 
which was followed on 5 October by a similar  announcement by 
President Mikhail Gorbachev of the U.S.S.R.  Although the Soviet Union  
collapsed shortly thereafter, the United States later reaffirmed this 
nuclear arms reduction  agreement by signing a treaty with Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on 23 May  1992. The final LANCE 
battalion stood down at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 30 June 1992. After  
being demilitarized, excess LANCE missiles were set aside for use as 
targets (http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/lance/summary.html). 
2.  Application of the TMO Framework  
a.  TMO Considerations 










1.  TMO 
Organizational 
Aspects 
LANCE was developed independently by the U.S. and control of the 
program remained within the U.S. for the life of the system.  The 
International community became involved through foreign military 
sales to NATO countries and Israel.    




Research Development and Engineering Center (RDEC)/Contractor 
Technical Support.  Technical support from RDEC and other sources 
played a crucial role in the development of Lance, although 
international considerations for technical support were minimal.  A 
key-concept that made Lance possible in an era of unreliable and 
inaccurate electronics was the variable thrust sustainer, conceived 
by Dr. McCorkle and Bob Canard at RDEC.  Effective exchange of  
information, including this key concept, between the Lance TMO 






Management of Technical Requirements did not involve the 
international community.  Lance was developed independently by the 






Management of Technical Risk involved teamwork between 
Government TMO and contractor developers.  Creation of detailed 
plans, using PERT tools, may have helped to identify problem areas 
early, but also created additional risks.  There were no technical 
risks directly associated with the international aspects of the 
program since the international involvement began following the 
completion of the development activity. 
5.  Technical 
Monitoring 
Capability 
Technical Monitoring Capability was initially centered on a massively 
complex PERT based schedule and resource tracking system.  
However, when it became apparent that the PERT based approach 
was not being effective, the approach was simplified to focus detailed 
planning on near term events.  Quantified milestones were instituted 
to provide intermediate goals that had to be met in order to continue 
development beyond clearly defined technical goals. However, there 
were no international considerations for technical monitoring. 
6.  Direct 
Technical 
Contribution 
Direct Technical Contribution from TMO was crucial to LANCE. 
Concepts developed by RDEC, such as the variable thrust sustainer 
made LANCE more accurate and reliable than would have been 
possible otherwise.   
7.  Control of 
and Access to 
Technical Data 
Control of and Access to Technical Data was not an issue for LANCE 
because no foreign participation occurred during development.   
8.  User 
Participation 
User Participation was minimal during LANCE development.   
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9.  Cost Share 
and Work 
Share 
Cost Share and Work Share were not an issue for LANCE 
development.  During production, costs for purchase of LANCE by 





Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW).  There  were no 




b. TMO Program Feedback Considerations 
Table 12 has the TMO Program Feedback elements for 
LANCE. 








International Executive Control  was not applicable for LANCE.  
 
2.  TMO 
Funding 
TMO Funding  did not include any unique international aspects. 
3.  National 
Interaction 
National Interaction was not an issue for development of LANCE.  
4.  US 
Acquisition 
Review prior to 
next phase 
There were no unique international aspects of acquisition review for 
LANCE. 
 
D.  MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS) 
Information for this MEADS TMO discussion has been taken 
primarily from an interview with Mr. William Bishop, 22 July 2001, and 
from the personal experiences of the author.  Mr. Bishop is the Chief 
Engineer of the International Program Office (IPO) for MEADS, directing a 
technical staff of engineers from Italy, Germany and the United States.  
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Mr. Bishop has also provided invaluable advice and guidance to the 
author in the development of this thesis.  The author is on technical staff 
to the U.S. MEADS National Product Office (NPO). 
 
1.  Overview 
An overview of the planned MEADS system is shown by Figure 16.  
MEADS began life in August 1990 in the U.S. with the approval of the 
Corps Air Defense Capability Mission Need Statement (MNS).  The Army 
was given ORD responsibility, and the system was given the name 
CORPS SAM.  The Milestone 0 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
approved entry into the Concept Exploration acquisition phase and  
required the project office to explore cooperative opportunities with allied 
MEADS SYSTEM CONCEPT (MSC)
M502t
Fire Control Radar
• Large Power Aperture Active Phased-Array
X Band Radar
• Multi-Mode Operation
– 360° All Aspect Coverage
• Self Contained Alignment
• Mobile & Transportable
– Cross Country / Truck Mounted




• Dynamic Force Tailoring
– Automatic Initialization
– Reconfigurable / Plug & Fight
• Netted & Distributed
– Netted Sensors Provide Continuous &
     Redundant Target Track
– Distributed Battle Elements Put Best
     Weapon on Target
– Eliminates Single Point of Failure
• All Sensors and TOCS Tied to High
   Speed Net
• Battalion-level TOC Coordinates





•  Hit-to-Kill Missile
•  Proven Technology
•  Highly Capable
PLUG & FIGHT
BMC4I • Pulsed-Doppler Phased-Array With
IFF Sensor
• UHF Operating Frequency Band
• Multi-Mode Operation
– 360° Coverage or Fixed
   90°Sector Operation
– Self Contained Alignment
• Mobile & Transportable
– Cross Country / Truck
   Mounted
– C-130 Roll On / Roll Off
• Mobile &
Transportable
– C-130 Roll On / Roll Off
• Self Contained
Alignment
• Erects to Vertical
Launch for 360º
Coverage
• PAC-3 / Missile Compatible
• Palletized Handling System
(PHS) or Crane Reload
  
Figure 16:  MEADS System Concept (from US MEADS NPO 
Program Documentation) 
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countries.  Countries contacted for potential involvement included 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, The 
Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom.  In the 1994 time frame, 
detailed discussions began with Germany and France.  In 1995, Italy 
joined the discussions and a formal Statement Of Intent (SOI) was 
signed.  An interim management office was established to coordinate 
program activities prior to establishment of the NATO MEADS 
Management Agency (NAMEADSMA).  
Development of a MEADS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
was begun in 1996.  France withdrew prior to MOU signing.  The 
Program Definition/Validation (PD/V) phase was initiated to 
competitively select the best technical approach and to select the MEADS 
prime contractor. MEADS International Consortium including Lockheed-
Martin, won the competition. 
The down-select to MEADS International was completed in 
December of 1999.  Shortly after the down-select was complete, funding 
concerns within the U.S. led to reconsideration of U.S. commitment to 
the program.  An Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) had been done by the 
U.S. Army Air Defense School (USAADASCH) during the PD/V phase 
along with a Cost As and Independent Variable (CAIV) analysis by the 
U.S. National Product Office (NPO).  The U.S. agreed to continue the 
program contingent on use of the PAC-3 missile in lieu of developing a 
new MEADS missile.  Additionally, full program funding was not 
committed by the U.S. and an interim three year Risk Reduction Effort 
(RRE) was established.  RRE was supposed to reduce risk and provide an 
opportunity to better understand program cost.  The U.S. then 
established full funding for MEADS in the Future Years Defense Plan. 
The change in the program led to a re-evaluation of program 
commitment by the German and Italian partners.  Complicating matters, 
the German Government changed and a re-evaluation of German defense 
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priorities began.  However, these difficulties have been overcome, and the 
30 Month RRE contract was awarded with MEADS International in July 
of 2001.    
 
2.  Application of the TMO Framework  
a.  TMO Considerations 
Table 13 captures the TMO Consideration elements for 
MEADS. 
 




1.  TMO 
Organizational 
Aspects 
Italy, Germany and the United States are partners in the MEADS 
program.  Current and planned Memorandum Of Understandings 
(MOUs) establish the MEADS program as an international co-
development program, where the three nations establish operational 
requirements, select the prime contractor, develop the system, and 
produce the system. 




Access by the IPO to Research Development and Engineering Center 
(RDEC)/Contractor Technical Support for MEADS TMO is proving to 
be difficult.  Some access is provided through U.S. NPO that is not 
subject to Cost Share/Work Share.  The IPO does have access to 
Contractor Technical Support that is subject to cost share and work 
share.   
3.  Management 
of Technical 
Requirements 
User requirements have been clarified and updated, particularly 
related to system interoperability with other Joint system.  
Obtaining international agreement for clarifications and updates of 
the International Technical Requirements Document (ITRD) may 
prove difficult. 
4.  Management 
of Technical 
Risk 
Technical Risk Management is made more difficult for MEADS 
because of  technology transfer restrictions.  The United States 
Army would like to include its most advanced (and sensitive) missile 
and sensor technology in the MEADS system.  However, the U.S. 
plan to time phase the foreign release of sensitive technology critical 
to the MEADS program complicates risk management.  The IPO is 
not able to address this risk early in the program, and will not be 
able to address this risk until the technology is released.  This is a 
dilemma for all parties and is an area where the U.S. MEADS NPO 
can help to address technical risk.  Some strain is put on the 
international partnership when partial access to MEADS critical 
technology is provided by any of the partners.  This has caused 
some frustration. 
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5.  Technical 
Monitoring 
Capability 
Technical Monitoring Capability for the MEADS program will be 
performed by NAMEADSMA’s TMO activity.  While the details have 
not yet been worked out, performance metrics will be developed to 
measure key performance parameters.  Software metrics will be 
used to help understand software development status and an 
earned value management system will be used to understand 
expended resources for planned activities. 
6.  Direct 
Technical 
Contribution 
f. At appropriate times it is crucial to clarify existing requirements 
and in some cases it may be necessary to add, modify or delete 
requirements. Development of contract Statement Of Work for 
future contracts is important. Activities that will directly impact 
MEADS TMO include trade studies, contract technical deliverables, 
electronic data access, scheduled reviews, simulations, quality 
assurance, configuration management, training, logistics, test 
requirements, subcontractor flow-down, and coordination with 
external programs. 
7.  Control of 
and Access to 
Technical Data 
Configuration Management (CM) and Government approvals to use 
information are difficult areas for MEADS.  For CM, delays in 
approving changes to requirements and specifications can be 
expected due to the international nature of the program.   Related to 
Government approval for use of sensitive information, a specific 
time phased release plan has been developed to govern the timing of 
the release of specific information, such as PAC-3 missile 
information.  The U.S. does not wish to release information before it 
is needed in the program, particularly because the partner nations 
(including the U.S.) have not yet committed to participate in the full 
up development program. 
8.  User 
Participation 
User Participation is different for European development programs 
than for typical U.S. Army development programs.  In U.S. Army 
programs, user participation is encouraged early and throughout 
development for feedback on technical aspects that will affect the 
User.   However, in Europe the same is not done.  This difference in 
approach will be addressed as the MEADS program continues. 
9.  Cost Share 
and Work Share 
The twin issues of MEADS Cost Share and Work Share  have a large 
impact on TMO for MEADS.   It is tempting to leave these issues to 
others to deal with, but the issues affect TMO at every level.  This 
affects prime contractor work allocation, it can affect technical 
support contractor personnel selection, it affects the organization of 
the NAMEADSMA office and if affects the ability of NAMEADSMA to 
obtain expert technical support on short notice when problems need 
to be solved. 
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Preparation of MEADS Contract Statements of Work (SOW) are more 
complex for the MEADS program than for a typical U.S. MDAP.  For 
a U.S. MDAP, the PM typically is given minimal external oversight in 
structuring contract SOWs.  However, in MEADS, the three partner 
nations have taken a strong interest in ensuring the contract SOWs 
with the prime contractor satisfy national interests.  This makes 




b. TMO Program Feedback Considerations 
Table 14 captures the TMO Program Feedback elements for 
MEADS. 
 




1.  International 
Executive 
Control 
Executive control for MEADS is more difficult than executive control 
for a U.S. only MDAP because there are more customers.  The more 
participants there are in any activity, the harder it is to please 
everybody.  For MEADS, the TMO issues that involve difficult 
executive action are system requirements, prime contractor work 
requirements, and balanced work share.   
2.  TMO 
Funding 
b. An important issue with MEADS TMO Funding  relates to 
balancing work share to match MOU agreements.  Some limited 
funding is available within the NPOs that is not subject to work 
share considerations, however, use of this funding is at the 
discretion of each NPO.  Although operating outside the IPO, some 
useful contribution has been made as a result of independent NPO 
funding, and it is hoped that future collaborative effort is possible.  
3.  National 
Interaction 
c.  National Interaction between NAMEADSMA and the partner 
nations is both enjoyable and frustrating.  It is enjoyable because 
participants can meet and get to know interesting people from other 
countries who have a common purpose.  The frustrating part 
involves restrictions on communications and technical exchanges 
resulting from the MEADS MOU and national regulations.   
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4.  US 
Acquisition 
Review prior to 
next phase 
d. U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program Phase is 
critical for the eventual success of the MEADS program.  Navigating 
the waters of the National acquisition  processes is difficult for 
NAMEADSMA because direct access to the National decision making 
processes is not available to NAMEADSMA.  Complicating things 
even more regarding the U.S. acquisition process, acquisition 
personnel in the U.S. are not accustomed to international 
acquisition. 
 
3.  Elaboration 
a.  Discussion: MEADS Program International 
Organization 
Figure 17 highlights key aspects of the current MEADS 
organization.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) MEADS 
Management Agency (NAMEADSMA), establishes and executes contracts 
with the MEADS Prime Contractor,  MEADS International.  The U.S. 
MEADS NPO supports the U.S Steering Committee member, and 
provides an interface to NAMEADSMA to the U.S. acquisition 
infrastructure.  The MEADS Executive Subcommittee (MESC) is an 
international coordinating body that supports the Steering Committee, 
whose membership includes the Product Managers from each nation’s 
NPO.   
It  may appear to the U.S. acquisition community as if the 
U.S. MEADS NPO is responsible for the program.  It is not.  As shown 
figure 17, a U.S. MEADS National Product Office (NPO), separate from 
NAMEADSMA, supports the U.S. Steering Committee member and 
provides NAMEADSMA a primary point of contact for interacting with the 
U.S. acquisition community.  The U.S.  MEADS NPO interacts with the 
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Figure 17:  MEADS Management Structure (from US MEADS NPO 
Program Documentation) 
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U.S. Defense Acquisition Executive, Overarching Integrated Process 
Team (OIPT), Integrating Integrated Process Team (IIPT) and Working 
Integrated Process Teams (WIPTs).  The NPO plays another role because 
of the U.S. desire to limit foreign access to technology.  The U.S. MEADS 
NPO facilitates technology transfer, while ensuring proper foreign release 
approve is obtained prior to transfer.  The U.S. MEADS NPO also does 
some technical work to understand and mitigate technical risk. 
 
 
(1) MEADS TMO Organizational Aspects and 
NAMEADSMA.   The NAMEADSMA engineering division is responsible for 
MEADS TMO.  TMO is more complex for NAMEADSMA than for a U.S. 
only program.  This is due to difficulties in changing organization 
structure to match technical needs and to match the abilities of the 
engineering staff.  The basic NAMEADSMA organization structure was 
established by the MOU, roughly according to work sharing agreements, 
and changes to that structure must be approved by the Steering 
Committee.  However, the Nations feel they own the positions that have 
been allocated, and this makes it difficult to move people within the 
organization as needs change.  Fortunately, each nation has brought 
talented people into the program and this helps to offset the problem.   
The nations tend to look at those positions as if they own 
those positions, therefore they have a say in what those 
positions do.  That is not unique to MEADS.  They have the 
same sort of thing in Europe where they do international 
programs.  This is just one of those things that with an 
international program you get involved in.  The nations tend 
to design the organization, somewhat, and to a large extent, 
organize it based on work-share and primarily on the tasks 
that need to be done.  Now they don’t ignore work to be 
done, but work share considerations are additional 
constraints on the organization. (Interview with William 
Bishop, 22 July 2001). 
 
(2)  MEADS TMO Organizational Aspects, the Steering 
Committee and the MESC.   The Steering Committee oversees the 
activities of NAMEADSMA and the MESC, consisting of the head of the 
NPOs from each nation supports the Steering Committee.  The Steering 
committee does not get involved in the day to day technical decisions 
that affect NAMEADSMA TMO.  Some technical issues related 
requirements and technical Statements of Work (SOWs) get special 
steering committee attention, beyond the executive attention that would 
occur for a U.S. only program.  For a U.S. only program, oversight can be 
expected for requirements, through the Operational Requirements 
Document.  However, a U.S. Program Manager (PM) will normally own 
the SOW and system specification. NAMEADSMA must obtain approval 
of the Steering Committee for substantive changes to the contract 
technical specification and the SOW.  This affects TMO because the 
68 
process for establishing the basis for and any changes to the work to be 
performed are tedious and time consuming. 
 
(3)  MEADS TMO Organizational Aspects and the U.S. 
MEADS NPO.  As with all U.S. personnel external to NAMEADSMA, the 
technical-staff within the U.S. MEADS NPO have difficulty with the 
reality that the U.S. is not in control of the MEADS program.  This 
confusion may exist because of limited international-program experience, 
the need to exchange technical information with other U.S. programs, 
and the desire by individuals to make meaningful technical 
contributions.   As with any group it takes some time to sort out and 
fully understand roles and responsibilities.   While working technical 
transfer issues and coordinating with other programs, opportunities are 
occurring for U.S. MEADS NPO technical personnel to contribute 
expertise.  Coordination between NAMEADSMA and the U.S. MEADS 
NPO has begun to occur to focus U.S. MEADS NPO technical resources 
on the technical issues that need to be worked.  To the extent that U.S. 
personnel are seen as supporting NAMEADSMA, this will be successful 
(Author’s opinion).  
 
b.  Discussion:  RDEC/Contractor Technical Support 
There is recognition by NAMEADSMA and all of the national 
participants of the potential high value of RDEC technical support, but 
no mechanism has been established to enable control and tracking of 
technical support work share when RDEC is involved.  To partially 
overcome this difficulty, a System Engineering Technical Assistance 
(SETA) corporation, MEADS Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), has 
created to provide NAMEADSMA access to technical support.  MEADS 
LLC will help to fill the technical support needs of the MEADS program, 
but there remains a desire to enable access to RDEC because of proven 
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expertise with simulations, software and radar technology.  Some 
support from RDEC is planned through the U.S. MEADS NPO, however, 
this support is not subject to cost sharing and is difficult to justify.  
Within the U.S. it is felt that the costs for technical support should be 
shared by all the partners because all partners benefit.  However, some 
technical aspects of MEADS are uniquely U.S., German or Italian, such 
as interface to national command and control systems, and applying 
independent funding to solve technical problems unique to the U.S. use 
of MEADS may be justified.  U.S. funded technical support for interfacing 
with U.S. provided subsystems such as PAC-3 may be justified because 
time phased access to PAC-3 information is being provided.   Ultimately, 
support from RDEC to the MEADS program may have to be funded 
independent of cost share agreements, however, a method of satisfying 
the MOU cost share agreement would be preferable, at least from the 
U.S. perspective. 
An example of the U.S. MEADS NPO providing technical 
support with direct impact on MEADS TMO involves frequency allocation 
support.  It is in the interest of the three MEADS partner nations to 
ensure the frequencies to be used by MEADS radars are acceptable for 
the areas in the world where MEADS is expected to be deployed.  
Ensuring this involves analysis of internationally agreed upon frequency 
allocation tables.  While on the surface this appears straight forward, it 
is not.  Demand for spectrum has exploded during the last decade, and it 
is becoming difficult to ensure radars will have the spectrum available for 
operations.  In any case, the U.S. MEADS NPO is dedicating effort to 
address this problem until the issue is resolved.  This effort is 
independent of cost share and work share considerations.  Italy and 
Germany are supporting similar efforts.  NAMEADSMA is playing a 
coordinating role, but is not funding the support. 
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c. Discussion:  Management of Technical Requirements 
Management of technical requirements in any complex 
system development is difficult.  On the one hand, requirements stability 
is desired in order to minimize change and resulting cost.  On the other 
hand, if the requirement is wrong and a change will be needed later 
anyway, then conventional wisdom is that the earlier the error is 
corrected, the lower the cost will be.  In the International Considerations 
section of this thesis, (Section C, Chapter II) the common desire of 
international programs to avoid requirements change was highlighted.  
MEADS is no different.  Within the TMO staff of MEADS there is a 
growing awareness that the International Requirements Document needs 
clarification in many areas.  However, there is strong reluctance to add, 
delete or change the intent of any requirement.  The ITRD will establish 
the technical requirements for the MEADS contract when the formal 
development program begins.  
From the perspective of requirements stability it is good not 
to change the ITRD.  From the perspective of the U.S. User, however, 
change is necessary to align the ITRD the U.S. MEADS Operational 
Requirements Document, which has changed in some of its technical 
detail.  During the world-wide staffing approval-process of the U.S. 
MEADS ORD, detail has been added that makes the ORD inconsistent 
with the ITRD.  Fortunately, much of the change to the ITRD that is 
desired by the U.S. can be looked at as a clarification of an existing ITRD 
requirement.  Also fortunately, the US ORD remains almost entirely 
consistent with the International Common Operating Requirements 
(ICOR) document, which is intended to serve the function of the ORD for 
the MEADS program.   
The U.S. MEADS NPO has expended considerable resources 
over the course of a year to understand the differences that have 
emerged between the ORD and the ITRD, and to suggest clarification 
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language for the ITRD.  NAMEADSMA has also expended considerable 
resources in trying to understand the nature of the suggested 
clarifications.  The need has been recognized by both organizations to 
collaborate at least to understand the issues.  It remains to be seen 
what, if any clarifications or changes are made as a result of this 
requirements review process.   This experience highlights the difficulty of 
managing requirements change for an international program, even prior 
to start of formal development. 
 
d. Discussion:  Configuration Control 
Configuration Control of technical data is critical for any 
program.  The uniqueness for MEADS, is that getting three nations to 
agree upon a particular change is difficult.  An effective mechanism for 
timely approval of engineering changes during the future development 
effort has not been established.    
It is usually difficult to obtain Steering Committee agreement 
on complex technical issues in a timely manner.  From that 
standpoint, I don’t yet know how we are going to do 
configuration management downstream during the D&D 
program phase.  The Steering Committee is presently the 
only body that can approve an engineering change to the 
technical requirements.  I’ve been on development programs 
where you have had to process performance requirements 
changes within a matter of a few days.  You found something 
out, you’ve got to make a change.  Unless the General 
Manager is appointed chairman of a CM board, it will take 
us a long time to obtain agreements for change.  Then we 
will have a lengthy delay, diminishing our ability to respond 
to dynamic situations in a timely manner. (William Bishop 
Interview, 22 July 2001). 
 
e. Discussion and Example: User Participation 
For MEADS Germans and Italians have difficulty with the 
idea of getting their User involved once the initial requirements have 
been established.   
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This is a unique thing that we‘ve run into, and it’s one of 
those things that I just have to file as incredible.  There is a 
mindset in the US that during the acquisition process when 
you’re building advanced systems you want user 
involvement, practically from day one.  And you want user 
involvement practically through the entire program. You 
even have a TRADOC system manager who is at roughly the 
same level as the program manager in the acquisition chain. 
But Europeans don’t necessarily do that.  And, some of them 
have a difficult time in wanting to bring their user people 
into the process at all.  That is something that has 
astounded me.   And I don’t know the background of why 
that is, but in Germany and Italy’s process, I’ve learned to 
accept their reluctance for direct user involvement in the 
acquisition process.   To them it probably makes perfect 
sense.  They have established their procedures for getting 
user input into requirements and there is very little if any 
(that I can discern) direct user input into project offices in 
Germany or Italy.  So, when you see the need for user input 
and you have to go to the three nations to request User 
participation, then the US has a tough time getting that view 
across.  And that problem has to be solved, in my opinion, 
for all three nations, because we are ultimately building 
something for the user.  You just don’t want to go for 8 years 
and suddenly drop something on the user.  (William Bishop 
Interview, 22 July 2001). 
An example of the difference between U.S. user participation 
and European User participation involves operational testing.  In the 
U.S., a system operational test involving Users in an operational 
configuration is mandated by law prior to fielding of the system.  There is 
no relief given to international programs.  There is no similar 
requirement in Europe.  To some extent this might be solved by how the 
developmental test program is structured for MEADS.  It may be possible 
to obtain agreement for a partial operational test of the system that 
demonstrates core functionality that is common for all three nations.  
However, this may take a change in thinking on the part of all three 
nations.   Otherwise we may end up effectively with three operational 
tests, and that will not be cost effective.   
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 f. Cost Share and Work Share Importance to TMO  
Cost Share and Work Share, … that is a super, super, super, 
biggy for TMO.  You almost want to say, ‘well that is politics.’  
But you can’t do that.  You would like to focus on just the 
Engineering.  But the engineering affects work-share!  I’ve 
spent too many hours talking work-share.  But, this a big, 
big thing in a international program, particularly to the 
Europeans.  It ought to be to the US too, but I think the 
Europeans have more experience with international 
programs, and they understand cost-share and work-share 
because they have had to.  And that has to be balanced, just 
like a lot of other things on the program.  And that is at the 
Steering Committee level, and they have to work through 
that, but it is a really big impact and this is another 
characteristic that makes TM unique on international 
program.   
 
How can that affect you?  Well, things that you want to do in 
terms of putting people on a particular problem.  If its 
outside of a support contract and you feel you need special 
expertise somewhere, then that becomes an item for cost 
share/work share.  It ought not to be that way, but it is.  If I 
have an unexpected fire going on at my house and I have to 
call the fire department, then that work will get involved in a 
cost share/work share issue that we’ll have to resolve later 
on, somehow.  That’s just a fact of life.  That affects TM fairly 
substantially. [William Bishop Interview, 22 July 2001). 
 
g.  Discussion:  Statement of Work 
The tri-nation involvement in SOW preparation has led to 
increased time to coordinate with staff from the three NPOs to prepare 
contract SOWs.   
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Cost share/work share issues flow into Contract SOW 
preparation. Not only is it that you have to worry about what 
it is you have got to do to accomplish the work, but also that 
SOW will be looked at by the nations, in terms of ‘what is in 
it for our industry.’  The prime contractor, when he 
proposes,  has to look at the SOW  and the cost share/work 
share constraints that he has and he has to balance the best 
he can.  That is not easily done, but he has to figure out how 
to do it.  … You mentioned earlier about the nations 
reviewing the SOW, … that was a horrendous exercise, and 
you just have to face the fact that SOWs are going to take a 
long time to coordinate.  And we have to figure out a better 
way to do it.   I don’t think we did the last process very well.  
We are going to have to do a better job for the Design and 
Development (D&D) phase.  But that is something the 
nations are going to get involved in ,and meticulously pick 
over words and paragraphs, and that’s just the nature of the 
beast, it comes with the territory.  But that is a unique thing 
about international programs.  A draft  D&D SOW exists, but 
there are other things that have impacted it.  What we don’t 
want to do is go in and open up things that have already 
been settled. But there have already been impacts to that 
D&D program.  That SOW will not be a simple thing to 
coordinate.  I don’t know any other way to do it than to get 
started on it early, because it is probably going to be harder 
and take longer than anticipated (William Bishop Interview, 
22 July 2001). 
 
h.  Discussion.  National Interaction 
For MEADS, national acquisition process interaction is 
either formally through the Steering Committee or informally through 
other means.  In the case of interaction with the U.S., most informal 
interaction is through the U.S. MEADS NPO.  This is to done to help 
ensure that the U.S. speaks with one voice when interacting with 
NAMEADSMA and to help ensure that sensitive U.S. information 
provided to NAMEADSMA is authorized for use in the MEADS program.  
Often U.S. personnel working for NAMEADSMA feel cut off and as if they 
are being treated as second class citizens because they are sometimes 
treated as foreign nationals (For security purposes, NAMEADSMA is 
considered a foreign agency).  However, part of the issue here is the 
discomfort felt by Italian and German NAMEADSMA personnel when U.S. 
NAMEADSMA personnel participate in U.S. only activities.   Both 
viewpoints are understandable and difficult to address.  The result is 
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that often the U.S. personnel at NAMEADSMA are not able to participate 
in U.S. acquisition meetings or technical meetings that may have a direct 
bearing on the program.  This uncomfortable situation is being handled 
on a case by case basis by management and individuals.  
 
i.  Discussion.  U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next 
Program Phase  
U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program Phase is 
critical for the success of MEADS.  Navigating the waters of the National 
acquisition  processes is difficult for NAMEADSMA because direct access 
to the National decision making processes is not available to 
NAMEADSMA.  Complicating things regarding the U.S. acquisition 
process, U.S. acquisition personnel are not accustomed to international 
acquisition.  U.S. statutes and regulations, developed during the Cold 
War, and evolving over time have not yet caught up with international 
MDAP acquisition, although much progress has been made.  Ideally, one 
process would exist for the U.S., Germany and Italy to decide upon 
continuation of the program at the end of each program phase.  However, 
there are three separate processes, each with its own data requirements 
and institutional decision criteria.  
The U.S. MEADS NPO plays a critical role in the U.S. 
acquisition process to transfer data from the MEADS program to the U.S. 
decision makers to enable continuation past the current Risk Reduction 
Effort and into the MEADS D&D phase (roughly equivalent to the DOD 
5000 System Development and Demonstration phase, see Figure 18).   
This is an uncomfortable role for the U.S. MEADS NPO 
because the NPO is accountable to the U.S. acquisition process for 
program performance but has no responsibility for program execution. 
The January 2001 updates to DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2, along 
with the June 2001 update to the Mandatory MDAP procedures in  
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  Figure 18:  MEADS Acquisition Compared with DOD 5000 (from US 
MEADS NPO Program Documentation) 
DOD 5000.2-R include special considerations for international programs, 
however, the U.S. MEADS NPO is severely challenged to address the 
expectations of the U.S. acquisition process. The basic difficulty is that 
acquisition documentation normally developed by an MDAP PM are not 
being developed by NAMEADSMA.  Yet the U.S. acquisition community 
expects these documents.  To obtain the documents desired, the U.S. 
MEADS NPO may have to independently develop the documents. 
However, this is not the desired solution.  It would be better 
for the U.S. to rely on a common set of acquisition documents developed 
by NAMEADSMA that will satisfy all of the partner nations.  To make this 
possible, relief may be needed from DOD 5000.2-R, June 2001 that 
states in paragraph C7.11.3.3 the following:  “C7.11.3.3 The DoD 
Component shall remain responsible for preparation and approval of 
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DoD-required documentation and reports (specifically: ORD, C4ISP, 
TEMP, APB, Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter, etc.).” 
In some cases the documents have been prepared or are 
being prepared and in some cases the need for these standard U.S. 
documents is being debated.  The U.S. Army Air Defense School 
(USAADASCH) is continuing to staff and update the U.S. MEADS ORD.  
An attempt was made in 1998 to eliminate the ORD in favor of the ICOR, 
however, this was not successful and the MEADS ORD remains a key 
U.S. acquisition document. The Command, Control, Computers and 
Intelligence Support Plan (C4ISP) is being developed by the U.S. MEADS 
NPO.  This document will support development of an international 
version that is being considered for development by NAMEADSMA.  A 
common test plan will be developed by NAMEADSMA that although not 
called a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), is hoped will satisfy the 
U.S. acquisition process and the acquisition processes for all national 
participants. 
The bottom line for U.S. acquisition review prior to the next 
program phase of the MEADS program is that the process will be difficult 
and close cooperation will be needed between the U.S. MEADS NPO and 
NAMEADSMA.  Fortunately, a foundation of cooperation and 
collaboration is developing within the TMO arena.  There is reason for 
optimism that the U.S. acquisition process will obtain the information 
needed to decide whether or not the U.S. will continue participation in 
the MEADS program into the D&D phase.  
 
E.  INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION (ISS) 
Information for the International Space Station TMO discussion is 
primarily from an interview with Mr. John Winch, who was a Boeing 
Engineer involved in ISS development from its inception.  Mr. Winch’s 
involvement with the ISS began in 1984 with Boeing proposal work 
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development of the then U.S. Space Station.  In 1987 he became  Deputy 
PM for Boeing’s Space Station effort.  Boeing had been awarded a 
contract for one of three major work package contracts for the Station.  
In 1991 Mr. Winch became PM.  After Boeing was selected as prime 
contractor following reorganization and internationalization of the 
program in 1995, Mr. Winch continued with his responsibilities in 
Huntsville for activities related to the original Boeing work package.  He 
retired in 1997.  
  
1.  Overview 
Figure 19 is a picture of the ISS taken in April of 2001.  This image 
was obtained from the NASA internet Universal Resource Locator (URL) 
address: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/station/assembly/lores/ 
s100e5970.jpg. 
The U.S. began developing what is now the ISS in the early 1980s.  
Initial efforts were disastrous for a number of reasons that will be 
discussed later.  However, following a reorganization of the effort in 1995, 
a drastic reduction in scope, the introduction of international 
participation and heroic efforts on the part of many people, the ISS is 
now in space.    
The International Space Station is the largest and most 
complex international scientific project in history. And when 
it is complete just after the turn of the century, the  station 
will represent a move of unprecedented scale off the home 
planet. Led by the United States, the International Space 
Station draws upon the scientific and technological 
resources of 16 nations: Canada, Japan, Russia, 11 nations 
of the European Space Agency and Brazil 
(http://www.shuttlepresskit.com /ISS_OVR ).  
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Figure 19:  International Space Station (from 
http://www.shuttlepresskit.com/ISS_OVR) 
Without international participation, it is unlikely that the 
international space station could have been developed.  Each participant 
has had and continues to have funding difficulties as each body politic 
struggles with priorities.  Nations pride, and a deep-seated human 
interest in space keep the program going.  Existing or planned elements 
of the ISS are described below. 
The U.S. elements include three connecting modules, or 
nodes; a laboratory module; truss segments; four solar 
arrays; a habitation module; three mating adapters; a 
cupola; an unpressurized logistics carrier and a centrifuge 
module. The various systems being developed by the U.S. 
include thermal control; life support; guidance, navigation 
and control; data handling; power systems; communications 
and tracking; ground operations facilities and launch-site 
processing facilities. 
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 The international partners, Canada, Japan, the European Space 
Agency, and Russia, will contribute the following key elements to the 
International Space Station: 
 · Canada is providing a 55-foot-long robotic arm to be used 
for assembly and maintenance tasks on the Space Station. 
 · The European Space Agency is building a pressurized 
laboratory to be launched on the Space Shuttle and logistics 
transport vehicles to be launched on the Ariane 5 launch 
vehicle. 
 · Japan is building a laboratory with an attached exposed 
exterior platform for experiments as well as logistics 
transport vehicles. 
 · Russia is providing two research modules; an early living 
quarters called the Service Module with its own life support 
and habitation systems; a science power platform of solar 
arrays that can supply about 20 kilowatts of electrical power; 
logistics transport vehicles; and Soyuz spacecraft for crew 
return and transfer (www.shuttlepresskit.com/ISS_OVR). 
 In addition, Brazil and Italy are contributing additional equipment 
to the station, including the Italian Logistics Module “Leonardo” that 
recently gained international acclaim. 
 
2.  Application of the TMO Framework  
a.  TMO Considerations 














1.  TMO 
Organizational 
Aspects 
The ISS organization started out as a distributed US activity that 
included 3 major subsystem developments.  with no central 
management control.  This was disastrous and led to restructuring.  
The new structure was international, including the U.S., Russia, the 
European Space Agency, Japan and others.  NASA remains 
responsible for coordinating operations, however, Boeing is 
responsible for all technical coordination and control of the major 
system interfaces.  Each partner is fully responsible for detailed 
specifications, funds, designs and the product agreed to.  
Internationally, the organization is loosely coupled with partners 
having distinct and clearly defined responsibilities that are product 
oriented.  




Government Lab/Contractor Technical Support is critical to the 
NASA ISS role of oversight, management of technical risk and 
general technology support. NASA does not involve foreign support-
contractors, that is left up to the participating partner nations.  
Similarly, the foreign partners have no issue with support 
contractors that NASA uses to provide technical support. 
3.  Management 
of Technical 
Requirements 
NASA sets the basic requirements.  Boeing maintains the day to day 
control of interfaces went through Boeing. Boeing also developed a 
System Specification to ensure a common understanding of the 
system requirements.  Lower level specifications, such as for the 
solar panel arrays were also firmly controlled.   International 
considerations for requirements center primarily on the docking 
interfaces and the interface of ISS components to the Space Shuttle, 
for those components to be transported by the Space Shuttle.  
Requirements such as safety, reliability, strength, vibration and 
stiffness were suggested to partners for use with their systems, 
however, specification responsibility for modules developed by 
partners such as the European Space Agency, Russia and Japan 
rests with the developing partner.   
4.  Management 
of Technical 
Risk 
Management Technical Risk is done by Boeing and independently 
by the partner nations.  However, NASA maintains oversight of 
safety and reliability for all elements of the ISS.  During the 
Mercury, Jupiter and Apollo space programs, NASA achieved 
success by emphasizing safety and reliability.  This emphasis was 
reduced when routine Space Shuttle operations began.  However, 
the Space Shuttle Challenger accident was a reminder to NASA that 
space operations are inherently dangerous.  Today, safety and 
reliability are key foci of risk management for NASA. 
5.  Technical 
Monitoring 
Capability 
NASA technical oversight is heavily focused on safety and reliability.  
NASA is responsible for overseeing the contracts it lets with Boeing, 
however, Boeing is pretty free to act within the bounds of the ISS 
contracts. All participants work together as a team.  This is possible 
because of the pride that individuals take in their participation in 
the grand adventure of space. 
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6.  Direct 
Technical 
Contribution 
Direct Technical Contributions are made by NASA and all 
participants based on the roles they play.  NASA provides facilities 
for Testing components, launching rockets and launching the Space 
Shuttle.  NASA also develops candidate technologies and processes 
that may be used on the ISS.  NASA provides the services of experts 
when needed by Boeing and the other participants.  Other 
Governments participate in the development of their ISS 
components as they see fit. All participants are highly motivated to 
succeed. 
7.  Control of 
and Access to 
Technical Data 
The policy of NASA for open flow of information relative to the ISS 
includes  Government generated information and to a very large 
extent, there is no proprietary data used for the ISS.  Almost all 
Government and contractor information is freely available to anyone 
with a legitimate need for access. 
8.  User 
Participation 
The concept of User Participation may not apply to development of 
the ISS, because there is no entity called the User for any NASA 
development activity. NASA  both develops the requirements and 
then executes contracts to develop the system.  The astronauts are 
to NASA and the ISS like soldiers are to the Army in that astronauts 
will use the ISS.  They  influence Human System Interface (HSI) 
issues. 
9.  Cost Share 
and Work 
Share 
Cost Share and Work Share is not an issue for the ISS.  Nations pay 
for the ISS components they are responsible to produce.  There is no 
sharing of development costs in that sense.  Canada paid for the 
development of the ISS robotic arm.  Russia paid for the service 
module, the European Union is paying for development of the 
European Space Agency’s laboratory and Japan is paying for 




j.  There are no special international considerations for the 
Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW) for the ISS.  
Each participating country makes its own arrangements with its 
industry for work to be performed. 
 
 
b. TMO Program Feedback Considerations 










1.  International 
Executive 
Control 
There is no international executive control of the ISS per se.  NASA 
controls development of the ISS, and it is purely through good will 
and common interest that enables international participation.  
2.  TMO 
Funding 
TMO Funding is split off of the overall program funds to support 
NASA oversight of Boeing and the international partners efforts. 
Safety and reliability are important focus areas for NASA and thus 
receive a good portion of the NASA TMO funds.   
3.  National 
Interaction 
Related to TMO, this involves primarily reliability and safety.  Most 
of the details of specification and design that are of interest to the 
U.S. are delegated to Boeing.   
4.  US 
Acquisition 
Review prior to 
next phase 
U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program Phase does not 
apply to the ISS. 
 
 
3.  Elaboration 
a.  ISS TMO International Organizational Aspects 
The original Space Station began in the mid 1980s almost 
exclusively as a U.S. program.  The original program was a disaster that 
resulted from inappropriate program structure and unaffordable 
requirements that constantly changed.  Initially the program was set up 
as a U.S. program with three major work packages.  NASA’s Lewis Center 
in Cleveland, Ohio managed a contract with Rockwell’s Rocketdyne 
Division.  NASA’s Johnson Center in Houston, Texas managed a contract 
with McDonald Douglas and NASA’s Marshal Center in Huntsville, 
Alabama managed a contract with Boeing.  The effort was supposed to be 
integrated and coordinated from NASA facilities in Reston, VA, who used 
Grumman for a support contractor.  The only problem was, the Reston 
activity had no control.   This was a recipe for confusion.  This was a 
recipe for disaster.  Spiraling costs and a growing sense that the program 
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was out of control led to restructuring of the program and 
internationalization of the program.   
In 1995 Boeing was given the Prime Contract for the 
reorganized International Space Station.  Boeing was expected to 
rationalize the program, identify a set of achievable requirements, 
establish control of the interfaces, coordinate with international partners, 
and make this all happen with the yearly fluctuating budget provided by 
congress.  NASA remained in nominal overall control, establishing the 
contract requirements with Boeing.  However, no central international 
coordinating body was established between Governments. 
Next to the United States, the most prominent international 
participant in the ISS development was Russia.  Bringing the Russians 
into the activity seemed purely political, at the time.  However, they 
brought a lot of knowledge and ability to the program.  There were good 
working relationships between the Russians and the Americans.  The 
main difficulty that emerged was the difficulty Russia had in meeting its 
commitments to deliver hardware.  This was a funding issue, however, 
and not an organizational issue.   
After Russia, the most visible participants in ISS 
development are the Germans, Italians and Japanese.  They have shown 
a strong desire to participate actively, and they are very capable.  The 
Italians developed the pressurized logistics module that can be 
transported via the space shuttle and re-used, and this has already 
played an important role in outfitting the ISS and making the ISS 
habitable.   
Organizationally, all who participate in the ISS development 
are members of a team with clearly established responsibilities.  NASA 
maintains a contract with Boeing that has a Statement Of Work (SOW) 
flexible enough to adjust according to annual funding.   Portions of the 
ISS are developed by Boeing and subcontractors.  The international 
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partners independently manage development of any ISS modules they 
have agreed to develop.   NASA’s role in the execution is contract 
oversight, providing launch and test facilities, technical consultation for 
materials and processes, and oversight of technical risk.  The team works 
because everyone knows their role and everyone wants to succeed. 
 
b.  Discussion:  ISS Management of Requirements 
Initially the intended use of the Space Station was poorly 
defined, but it was required to be everything to everybody.  This proved to 
be to much to accomplish and too expensive.  So it had to be scaled back 
continuously over the years.  There was cutback after cutback after 
cutback.  After Boeing was made prime contractor for the entire project, 
the situation improved.   
In terms of fundamental requirements, NASA still sets the 
basic requirements.  However, following selection of Boeing as the prime 
contractor, the day to day control of interfaces went through Boeing.  
And, although not required to, Boeing developed a System Specification 
to ensure a common understanding of the system requirements.  Lower 
level specifications, such as for the solar panel arrays were also firmly 
controlled.   
International considerations for requirements centered 
primarily on the docking interfaces and the interface of ISS components 
to the Space Shuttle, for those components to be transported by the 
Space Shuttle.  Requirements such as safety, reliability, strength, 
vibration and stiffness were suggested to partners for use with their 
systems, however, specification responsibility for modules developed by 
partners such as the European Space Agency, Russia and Japan rests 
with the developing partner.  Boeing maintains control of the docking 
interface and the interface of ISS components to the Space Shuttle.  To 
ensure absolute adherence to the docking interface, Boeing provides the 
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actual docking interface hardware to the partner nation for use on the 
actual ISS module.  The partner then must integrate (weld) the docking 
interface into the ISS module being developed.  
 
c.  Discussion:   Control of and Access to Technical Data  
Control of and access to technical data is different for 
development of the ISS than for development of military systems.  The 
effectiveness of military systems sometimes depends a great deal on 
depriving the adversary of technical details about the system.  A military 
system is potentially more vulnerable if an adversary knows how the 
system works and its weaknesses.  The ISS, and other NASA systems, on 
the other hand are not military systems and are not been developed with 
the idea of having to survive an attack.  NASA does not withhold 
information.  NASA has a policy of openness that is sometimes close to 
being in conflict with the State Department export policies.   
Sometimes export policies of the U.S. have been cause for 
Boeing to avoid direct transmittal of data to companies in other 
countries.  Often, NASA has acted as the intermediary to enable the 
transmittal of critical technical information.   
 
F.  MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) TERMINAL GUIDED 
WARHEAD (TGW)  
Information for this discussion is primarily from an interview with 
Mr. Dennis Vaughn, who was worked on the MLRS program for 8 years 
as the Division Chief for Product Assurance and Test (PA&T) and then for 
12 years as the MLRS Deputy Program Manager (DPM).  While PA&T 
Division Chief Mr. Vaughn was also chairman of the MLRS multinational 
test working group.   
For the purpose of discussing TMO, this section focuses on the 
MLRS TGW warhead development.  However, some comments are 
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directed at the overall MLRS program for context or as information that 
may be of value. 
 
1.  Overview 
Figure 20 is an image of an MLRS rocket being fired from an M270 
rocket launcher.   
The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), formerly known 
as the General Support Rocket System (GSRS), is designed 
to supplement cannon weapons available to U.S. Army 
division and corps commanders for the delivery of a large 
volume of firepower in a very short time against critical, 
time-sensitive targets. MLRS is a free-flight artillery rocket 
system that greatly improves the conventional, indirect fire 
capability of the field Army. The system provides counter-
battery fire and suppression of enemy air defenses, light 
materiel, and personnel targets.  
 
Figure 20:  MLRS Rocket Firing (from 
http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/systems/MLRS.html) 
… 
23 Jul 80 The governments of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and France signed a formal declaration 
of intent to participate in the concept definition phase of the 
terminal guidance warhead (TGW) program [for use with 
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MLRS]. The primary mission of the TGW would be to provide 
rapid fire, non-nuclear capability to destroy a wide spectrum 
of stationary and moving, medium hard to very hard, 
armored targets. The declaration required that the TGW be 
jointly developed, with active participation by industries of 
all four nations 
(http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/systems/ 
MLRS.html). 
TGW was intended to be an autonomous seeking warhead for use 
with the MLRS rocket.  However, TGW development ended following 
successful test dispense from an in-flight MLRS missile.  The program 
was terminated prior to system maturation and production.   
 
2.  Application of the TMO Framework  
a.  TMO Considerations 
 Table 17 captures the TMO Consideration elements for 
MLRS TGW. 
 




1.  TMO 
Organizational 
Aspects 
The TGW effort was a U.S. led co-development effort involving shared 
responsibility within the Program Office from the participating 
nations: the United Kingdom (UK), Germany (GE), France (FR) and 
the United States (US).  The TGW product office consisted of 
Associate Product Managers (APMs) from each participating nation, 
with technical staff including engineering, test and logistics 
personnel from each participating nation.  The APMs all reported to 
the PM for MLRS, who was a US Colonel.   Each participating 
country maintained an MLRS Program Office for internal national 
coordination.  The MLRS TGW Executive Management Committee 
consisting of the National PMs for MLRS and the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager or his equivalent 
User representative was the primary international coordinating body 
for MLRS TGW.  The Executive Management Committee was chaired 
by the U.S. PM for MLRS, although each member was of equal status 
for decision making.  In turn, the Management Executive Committee 
reported to the MLRS Joint Steering Committee, which was a two-
star board of directors providing international executive oversight 
over the MLRS TGW program.   
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Technical Support was critical to the conduct of the MLRS TGW 
development effort.  The key to enabling this support was an activity 
in the MLRS program office to manage overall cost share and work 
share.  This allowed the PM MLRS flexibility to arrange for technical 





Establishing the initial requirements for MLRS TGW was difficult and 
required a great deal of time.  Agreeing to targets for the system was 
the biggest difficulty.  Once the initial requirements were set liaison , 
the management of change to specifications was managed through 
each nations Associate Product Managers, who understood the type 
of changes that could be agreed and those that would require 





Management of Technical Risk involved periodic 
cost/schedule/technical risk assessments.  In some cases, 
competing designs were carried forward to selected decision points.  
Day to day activities in Huntsville involved technical reviews and 
interchanges with the prime contractor and major subcontractors.  
The APMs for each country went through the program from top to 
bottom on behalf of their nation to provide feedback to their national 
PM regarding significant technical risk.  Millimeter Wave technology 
was a major risk for TGW.  The basic millimeter wave technology was 
brought in by Germany.  The US brought in IR technology which also 
contained significant risk. 
5.  Technical 
Monitoring 
Capability 
Technical Monitoring Capability was divided between  RDEC, labs 
within other nations, and contract support.  For technical oversight 
involving test, there was a good degree of involvement from all 
participating nations. 
6.  Direct 
Technical 
Contribution 
Engineers, testers, and logisticians from the MLRS Program Office 
made Direct Technical Contributions.  The US unique contributions 
were related to requirements, the selection of targets and system 
evaluation.  The US unique activities were essential to establishing 
the US position for requirements discussions and definitions of 
SOWs.  In general, all parties brought competent and aggressive 
technical talent to TGW.  The difficult part of this was the time 
required to address everyone’s concerns.  The value of having smart 
people doing TMO is identification of problems that might not 
otherwise be found.  The difficulty is that some of the problems 
found are not problems.  Addressing them takes time and energy 
away from solving the real problems.   
7.  Control of 
and Access to 
Technical Data 
For MLRS,  the participating nations all brought valuable 
information into the program, and technology transfer of sensitive 
U.S. technology did not become an insurmountable problem.  Two 
specific difficulties:  (1) Establishing access in U.S. contractor 
facilities for non-U.S. people.  (2) Establishing a process for 
transmitting electronically or through the mail classified and 
sensitive programmatic and design information.   
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8.  User 
Participation 
User Participation was critical for MLRS in general and for TGW, 
particularly for establishing the basic TGW system requirements and 
target characteristics.  Each country was represented on the TGW 
Executive Management Committee by the country PM and TSM level 
User representative.  This solid connection to the user communities 
enabled difficult issues to be addressed relatively quickly.   
One issue revolved around facilities for depot maintenance.  
Common logistics support was established for MLRS in Europe.  This 
worked well for the US due to the heavy US presence in Germany.  
However, for the US to use the European repair facility, effective 
configuration control of components was essential.  The approach 
proved effective.  During Desert Storm, the US and European units 
were able to use the same spare parts. 
9.  Cost Share 
and Work 
Share 
Cost Share and Work Share portions for TGW were agreed upon in 
the TGW MOU.  They were US: 40%; GE: 20%; FR: 20%; UK: 20%.  
For cost share, the national currencies were “Pegged” at some initial 
equivalence, and then this equivalence was used throughout the 
TGW activity. Work share was more difficult to manage, because 
expertise was not evenly distributed and companies were cautious 
about revealing their trade secrets.  Additionally, distributing work 
geographically incurred penalties because of distance and the 
difficulty in communicating over long distances.   
The prime contractor, an international consortium, was responsible 
for managing work share for the contracted effort.  PM MLRS was 
responsible for managing overall work share.  It was recognized early 
that work share would not always be in balance.  A work share 
problem from one development phase could be addressed in the next.  
Ultimately, imbalances remaining once production began could be 
addressed by adjustments to third party sales.  Duplicate MLRS 





Discussion: Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW) was 
time consuming and required great effort on the part of all 
participants.  The TGW SOWs were of great interest to each national 
PM, and obtaining agreement for the content of the SOWs at the 
National PM level was essential, although laborious. 
 
 
b. TMO Program Feedback Considerations 
 Table 18 captures the TMO Program Feedback elements for 












The Joint Steering Committee did not get directly involved in the day 
to day decisions and coordination that was necessary between 
nations.  This coordination was performed by the TGW Executive 
Management Committee.  When issues arose that the executive 
management committee was not empowered to address, they were 
raised to the level of the Joint Steering Committee.  
2.  TMO 
Funding 
b. TMO Funding was managed by the PM within the context of Cost 
Share and Work Share.  The main thing was to balance the overall 
work share in line with cost share, however, and TMO was only one 
element considered when balancing cost share and work share.  
Some funding was allocated by PM MLRS for US unique activity 
which was accounted for and managed separately.  
3.  National 
Interaction 
National Interaction with the US bureaucracy involved dealing with 
people who were detractors and those who were proponents.  
Generally the detractors have difficulty dealing with international 
programs because they fall outside of establish procedures for 
security and accountability.  With TGW, people in the US acquisition 
process had not yet become accustomed to working with 
international programs.   
“Decision makers in the US cannot go to the PM and demand 
something in particular.  The US PM has to go to the international 
program partners and consult.  Sometimes the US decision makers 
are looking for a direct answer (Dennis Vaughn Interview, 16 August 
2001).” 
4.  US 
Acquisition 
Review prior to 
next phase 
The U.S. acquisition review process was essentially the same for 
MLRS as for other U.S. acquisition programs.  The difference was 
that an attempt was made to minimize the duplication of 
documentation needed by each country’s acquisition process.  For 
example, the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) was expanded 
to include consideration for European testing and the needs of GE, 
FR and UK decision makers.  The Acquisition Strategy document 
required by the U.S. acquisition process, was too different than what 
was needed by the European acquisition processes.  Excerpts from 
the US document were used to satisfy European acquisition needs, 
however, the US document was maintained separately.   
 
 
3.  Elaboration 
a.  TMO International Organizational Aspects 
The TGW development effort was conducted within the 
framework of the existing MLRS program structure.  A separate MOU 
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was created for TGW, however this MOU was written to be consistent 
with the basic MLRS MOU.   The MLRS international relationships are 
depicted in Figure 21.   
The TGW effort was 
a co-development effort 
involving shared responsibility 
within the Program Office from 
the participating nations: the 
United Kingdom (UK), Germany 
(GE), France (FR) and the 
United States (US).  The TGW 
product office consisted of 
Associate Product Managers 
(APMs) from each participating 
nation, with technical staff 
including engineering, test and 
logistics personnel from each participating nation.  The APMs all reported 
to the PM for MLRS, who was a US Colonel.   Each participating country 
maintained an MLRS Program Office for internal national coordination.  
The MLRS TGW Executive Management Committee consisting of the 
National PMs for MLRS and the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) System Manager or his equivalent User representative was the 
primary international coordinating body for MLRS TGW.  The 
Management Executive Committee was chaired by the U.S. PM for MLRS, 
although each member was considered of equal status for decision 
making.  In turn, the Management Executive Committee reported to the 
MLRS Joint Steering Committee, which was a two-star board of directors 
providing international executive oversight over the MLRS TGW program.   
 
Figure 21:  MLRS Management (from 
interview  with Dennis Vaughn) 
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b.  Discussion:  RDEC/Contractor Technical Support  
RDEC/Contractor technical support was critical to the 
success of TGW development.  Not the least of this technical support 
provided by RDEC involved a  Hardware In the Loop (HWIL) facility that 
was used by both the developing contractor and the MLRS Program 
Office.  Technical support came in two flavors for MLRS TGW.  There was 
technical support paid for solely by the U.S., and there was technical 
support subject to cost share and work share.   PM MLRS had authority 
to establish TGW support activities, with the caveat that the overall work 
share was supposed to remain balanced for support that applied to 
partner nations.  Surveys were made to find potential sources for support 
in the participating nations.  The goal was to give each country a fair 
share based on the overall MOU cost share/work share agreement.  
However, there was no special cost share/work share pool that had to be 
balanced for contract technical support.  The requirement was to balance 
the overall cost share/work share for TGW.  It was recognized early on in 
MLRS that the PM needed to have the authority to make decisions, … 
and he did make decisions.  Many times there were sessions of the MLRS 
Executive Management Committee to debate and ratify these decisions.  
National interests were involved, but it was also recognized that the 
program needed to move forward and that compromise was necessary. 
 
c.  Discussion:   Management of Technical Requirements  
Management of technical requirements for TGW was difficult 
in terms of establishing the initial TGW requirement.   Much of the 
difficulty centered around target selection and characterization of the 
target selected.  This, in turn, led to difficulty in the selection of the 
technology to use.  TGW was an autonomously guided warhead that 
relied upon the target’s fundamental physical characteristics for terminal 
guidance.   
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Each nation’s Users were actively involved in establishing 
the basic requirements, and each used similar processes. 
When you really get down to the details, each of the nations 
goes through the same process to arrive at a system.  The 
users define the need, negotiate with the developers on what 
is achievable to arrive at a system requirement, no matter 
what name you call it.(Dennis Vaughn Interview, 16 August 
2001) 
 
For managing the requirements, the TGW Executive 
Management Committee addressed the top level requirements at a level 
that would be similar to the US ORD level.  A system specification was 
published to reflect the common requirements of the Users from UK, GE, 
FR and US.  Any changes to this system specification required agreement 
by the TGW Executive Management Committee.   
Requirements allocated to lower level specifications were 
generally addressed within the MLRS Program Office by national APMs or 
engineers who were expected to speak for their countries, and they were 
expected to know when to coordinate with their National PMs.  Electronic 
Configuration Management (CM) was used.  Local people in the 
Huntsville MLRS Program Office sat on the TGW CM board.   
It ran pretty smoothly.  There were hard arguments for hard 
issues, but, things ran pretty smoothly (Dennis Vaugh 
Interview, 16 August 2001). 
 
d. Discussion:  Technical Monitoring Capability  
Technical monitoring capability was divided between  RDEC, 
labs within other nations, and contract support.  For technical oversight 
involving test, there was a good degree of involvement from all 
participating nations. 
There was a degree of competition between test ranges in the 
different partner nations.  Where was the most effective place 
to do this testing?  Everything from component and 
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environmental testing to flight testing.  The first factor 
considered was ‘How effective would the test facility be?’ The 
second factor considered was work share.  Components, test 
equipment, analysis, … these things were spread around.  
And then there was the ordnance board and the safety board 
(Dennis Vaughn Interview, 16 August 2001). 
 
e.  Discussion:  Control of and Access to Technical Data  
Control of and access to technical data was an important 
difficulty to overcome.  Concern for control of information exchanged 
between contractors and between Governments is less in Europe than in 
the US, because European nations are more accustomed to cooperative 
development effort.   
Visa/Working/Security arrangements at the start were very 
difficult.  Trying to set up in the industry for foreign 
nationals to come to Orlando or Dallas and have the freedom 
to come and go and to open a file cabinet took, … in some 
cases , a long time.  There are a lot of rules in the US that 
are not geared for multinational programs.  … Or, it was a 
problem if  someone critical to the program had a visa run 
out and he had to go back to Europe(Dennis Vaughn 
Interview, 16 August 2001). 
Secure communications between PMs and particularly 
between national PMs in the US and counterparts was difficult.  To solve 
that problem, security equipment was sent to the other offices just  get 
past the compatibility issues.   Flow of information in general was 
difficult.  A special office was set up within the MLRS Program Office to 
handle the exchange of information between countries. 
We had a central office in the PM shop that all information flowed 
through.  We were able to use diplomatic carriers and individuals 
within each contractor that were designated carriers.  There were 
couriers between each country.  For any US information to be 
exchanged, it had to come in through security channels, with proper 
approval (Dennis Vaughn Interview, 16 August 2001). 
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f.  Discussion:  Cost Share and Work Share  
Cost share and work share portions for TGW were agreed 
upon in the TGW MOU.  They were US: 40%; GE: 20%; FR: 20%; UK: 
20%.  For cost share, the national currencies were “Pegged” at some 
initial equivalence, and then this equivalence was used throughout the 
TGW activity.  The exchange rate was fixed for TGW.  Although several 
attempts were made to change the rates, no change was made while the 
program was active.   
Work share was more difficult to manage, because expertise 
was not evenly distributed and companies were cautious about revealing 
their trade secrets.  Additionally, distributing work geographically 
incurred penalties because of distance and the difficulty in 
communicating over long distances.   
The prime contractor, an international consortium, was 
responsible for managing work share for the contracted effort.  PM MLRS 
was responsible for managing overall work share.  It was recognized early 
that work share would not always be in balance.  A work share problem 
from one development phase could be addressed in the next.  Ultimately, 
imbalances remaining once production began could be addressed by 
adjustments to third party sales.  Duplicate MLRS production lines had 
been set up in the U.S. and in Europe. 
All during the program we tried to balance the work.  
Sometimes it may not have been the best technical location 
to do the work (from the U.S. perspective), but if Germany 
was down in work share, then work might be sent to labs in 
Germany (Dennis Vaughn Interview, 16 August 2001). 
Conversion of currencies for payment of program activities 
was minimized by establishing a bank in each country for the payment of 
contractor effort in that country.  The PM MLRS maintained records of 
work performed and issued payment vouchers to the appropriate banks 
for work performed in FR, GE, UK or US.   
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As a side note, a follow-on MLRS program called Guided 
MLRS (GMLRS), does not impose an absolute work share on the partner 
nations.  It is primarily a best value effort.  However, GMLRS is a 
significantly lower cost development than was TGW.  It is not certain 
what motivated the other partners to agree to this best value approach.  
Certainly the desire for the capability was a factor.  The desire to simplify 
management of the effort and to reduce costs may have also been factors.   
 
g.  Discussion: Preparation of Contract Statements of 
Work (SOW)  
Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW) was time 
consuming and required great effort on the part of all participants.  The 
TGW SOWs were of great interest to each national PM, and obtaining 
agreement for the content of the SOWs at the National PM level was 
essential, although laborious.   
The requirements and the SOW have to go through 
individual nation’s decision processes.  The budget years 
don’t line up.  Timing of the decision processes don’t always 
line up.  There just was a lot of work and patience required 
to pound through the arguments.  It goes through all of the 
functional disciplines, a laborious process.  It also requires 
leadership in these working groups and the branches and so 
forth that can deal with compromises (Dennis Vaughn 
Interview, 16 August 2001). 
 
h.  Discussion: National Interaction  
National interaction with the US bureaucracy involved 
dealing with people who were detractors and those who were proponents.  
Generally the detractors have difficulty dealing with international 
programs because they fall outside of establish procedures for security 
and accountability.  With TGW, people in the US acquisition process had 
not yet become accustomed to working with international programs.   
98 
Decision makers in the US cannot go to the PM and demand 
something in particular.  The US PM has to go to the 
international program partners and consult.  Sometimes the 
US decision makers are looking for a direct answer (Dennis 
























V.  ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
A.  OVERALL ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The framework depicted in figure 22 has been used to organize 
information gathered during interviews with senior technical leaders 
from high profile international programs.  This section summarizes the 
analysis, presents conclusions and makes recommendations. 
Technical Management
Oversight
                             










Control of and Access to Technical Data
User Participation (HFE Studies, Etc)
Cost Share/Work Share Affecting TMO











Figure 22:  International Technical Management Oversight 
Framework 
1.  Overall Analysis and Conclusion for Framework Utility 
The TMO framework was effective in structuring data collection for 
TMO data collection and study of international programs.  The TMO 
framework elements were found to have various degrees of utility.  A 
criterion called “coupling,” emerged from the analysis, that correlates to 
the utility of some framework elements for particular programs.  Tight 
coupling exists for a program if significant international coordination is 
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required for program execution.  This situation existed for the MEADS 
and the MLRS TGW programs.  Loose coupling exists for a program if 
minimal international coordination is required.  This framework for 
evaluation of international programs is most effective for tightly coupled 
international programs. 
Figure 23 depicts the composite utility of each TMO framework 
element assessed.  The detailed assessments for each framework element  
a b c d e f g h I j k l m n
HAWK
 
TMO Framework Element Key 
a.  TMO Organizational Aspects 
b.  RDEC/Contractor TechSupport 
c.  Management of Tech Rqmts 
d.  Management of Technical Risk 
e.  Technical Monitoring Capability 
f.  Direct Technical Contribution 
g.  Control/Access to Technical Data 
h.  User Participation 
i.  Cost Share and Work Share 
j.  Preparation of Contract SOWs 
k.  International Exec Control 
l.  TMO Funding 
m. National Interaction 






MLRS TGWcan be found in section B of this chapter.  As suggested by Figure V – 2, 
“TMO Organizational Aspects” is universally applicable.  That is because 
the organization description characterizes each program as tightly 
Figure 23:  TMO Framework Element Utility 
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coupled or loosely coupled, which becomes a predictor of how useful this 
framework is for describing an international program. 
Two elements are shown to have no value for this framework.  This 
is because the information that would be collected in these elements is 
already collected in other elements.  The International Executive Control 
element corresponds to the TMO Organizational Aspects element.  The 
TMO funding element corresponds to the Cost Share Work Share 
element.  Another element that may be redundant is the Technical 
Monitoring Capability element.  This element overlaps with the 
RDEC/Contractor Technical Support element.  Overall, it appears the 
TMO framework has value for description and study of a range of 
international programs, but the greatest utility is for the description and 
study of tightly coupled international programs. 
 
2. TMO Conclusions 
This paper proposes a framework for capturing and studying TMO 
insights for international programs. Interviews were conducted with key 
program personnel from several programs to populate the framework 
with program data.  Programs considered were HAWK, ROLAND, LANCE, 
MEADS, the International Space Station, and MLRS TGW.  These 
programs had various degrees of international participation.  Valuable 
insights were captured that can be applied to the structure and conduct 
of ongoing and future international programs.   
From the information collected, specific conclusions can be made 
regarding international programs: 
• TMO Organizational Aspects 
− The organization structure and rules for change strongly impact 
TMO. 
− Coupling within international programs affects management 
complexity. 
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− There may be a relationship between the degree of coupling of 
international programs and program success, but this was not 
verified with data. 
• RDEC/Contractor Technical Support 
− TMO Technical Support is crucial for international programs. 
− Support is needed to ensure contractor accountability, to do 
requirements analysis, to aid in technology transfer, to make 
direct technical contributions and to represent the Users 
interests. 
− When cost share and work share are considerations, they must 
be applied to Technical Support 
• Management of Technical Requirements 
− Knowing who the customer is, is important (Collectively the 
Users of the participating nations). 
− Requirements analysis and update is more difficult for an 
international program and the difficulty increases with the 
number of participants. 
− Early establishment a process for clarification and update of 
requirements is important. 
− Local national representatives should be empowered to approve 
requirements changes and specification changes that do not 
affect the major performance requirements of the system. 
− Stabilizing of requirements before starting a major international 
development is desirable.  If changes are necessary, they should 
be done prior to start of a focused development activity. 
• Management of Technical Risk 
− Risks should be identified and acknowledged, but diplomacy is 
important 
− There is risk integrating systems developed outside the U.S. into 
U.S. Systems and this risk should be managed (see ROLAND 
write-up). 
− For tightly coupled international development programs, 
technology transfer risks must be aggressively managed.  Some 
independent US action should be expected if full disclosure of 
information is not provided. 
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• Technical Monitoring Capability 
− Establishing an effective TMO presence as a legitimate part of 
the Contractor/IPO/Government development effort will pay big 
dividends.   
− Diplomatic communication is important when one country 
monitors/reviews another countries contractors 
− Responsibility for oversight of a nations contractors can be 
effectively accomplished by representatives of that nation. (See 
write-up for MLRS TGW) 
• Direct Technical Contribution  
− TMO direct technical contributions are crucial for program 
success 
− Areas for TMO direct technical contribution include 
requirements analysis, trade studies, coordination of technology 
transfer, simulation, performance evaluation, interoperability, 
human systems integration, and whatever expertise people have 
in the IPO and in the NPOs. 
− IPO and NPO can become too involved and add schedule risk  
• Control of and Access to Technical Data 
− Effective configuration management of internal program data is 
crucial.  National representatives within an IPO should be 
empowered to authorize changes not affecting major 
performance requirements of the system. 
− Tightly coupled international programs that require access to 
tightly controlled technical data require special management 
attention, especially from the nation that is controlling the 
information.   
− Clear Technology release policy is crucial. 
− Consistency in the release and control of information from one 
nation to others is extremely important.  Once data of a certain 
type has been released, it is understandable why national 
representatives are offended when information of that type is 
withheld later.  International incidents may be generated if this 
occurs. 
− False impressions of future information release must be 
avoided.  The risk of potentially not getting release should be 
understood. 
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− Arrangements need to be made for efficient transfer of classified 
and unclassified program information, both electronically and 
hardcopy, to and from the participating nations. 
• User Participation 
− User participation is important for the clarification of 
requirements, human system integration trade studies and test 
− Participating Nations have different views on the degree of User 
participation.  
• Cost Share and Work Share 
− It is possible to manage overall work share in a way that allows 
access to participating government’s Labs and agencies (See 
MLRS TGW write-up) as well as to support contractors 
− An agreement to allow balancing of work share in subsequent 
program phases can be very helpful and give the IPO much 
needed flexibility for TMO. 
• Preparation of Contract Statements of Work 
− Each participating nation must put an SOW for system 
development through its national decision processes, making 
the process for developing and approving SOWs very time 
consuming.   
− Having senior people involved in SOW development with the 
capability to make sensible compromises is extremely valuable 
− A bad international SOW is not more likely to gain approval as 
it ages. 
• National Interaction 
− Patience and diplomacy are important 
− Release requirements for information complicate National 
Interaction 
− Management attention is needed in US involvement in 
International programs to educate participants in the US 





• U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program Phase. 
− U.S. Policy for acquisition review has not caught up with 
international programs and needs to be updated following 
serious debate about priorities and technology transfer policies. 
 
3.  TMO Recommendations 
• For future international programs, consider minimizing the 
international coupling of the programs so that  the need for 
international coordination is minimized, organizational friction is 
reduced and each partner is able to understand the national role in 
the development program. 
• Initiate a debate within the U.S. about the degree to which the U.S. 
will  participate in future international programs that necessitate 
release of sensitive U.S. data. 
• For future international programs, ensure adequate processes are 
established prior to program initiation to manage cost share and work 
share to enable access to national laboratories, support contractors, 
prime contractors and subcontractors. 
• Know the customer. 
• Train all participants in international programs how to be diplomatic 
in communicating to international counterparts. 
• Anticipate and plan for U.S. specific activity in tightly coupled 
international programs that involve use of sensitive U.S. data. 
• For future international programs, plan technical staff for both 
international and U.S. specific activities to address technical issues 
that are out of reach of the prime contractor. 
• For future international programs, plan resources to support 
technology transfer and to obtain approvals to release U.S. 
information into the international program. 
• For future international programs, make plans for courier and 
electronic transfer of classified and unclassified program information 
between all parties. 
• Plan to balance work share across program phases to improve TMO 
flexibility. 
• Plan adequate time for preparation and approval of international 
SOWs. 
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B. TMO FRAMEWORK ELEMENT ANALYSIS  
1.  TMO Considerations Framework Elements 
a. TMO International Organizational Aspects  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  The International 
Organizational Aspects TMO Framework Element has high value.  With 
information from this element it was possible to classify programs 
according to degree of international involvement, method of involvement, 
and degree coupling of international partners.  Describing a program as 
“Tightly Coupled,”  such as for the MEADS program, suggests that 
program success is highly dependent upon successful coordination 
between the international partners.  Describing a program as loosely 
coupled, such as for the International space station, suggests that the 
program can be successful with minimal coordination between national 
partners.  Table 19 lists the programs, suggests classification of the 
programs and suggests a high value for this framework element as 
applied to each of the programs reviewed.   
 
(2)  TMO Lessons Learned.  The programs reviewed 
had varied international organizational aspects.  From the information 
gathered in chapter IV, it can be surmised that the degree of 
international involvement does not impact program execution nearly as 
much as the method of involvement and the degree of coupling between 
international partners in the management of the program.  It is apparent 
that tightly coupled international programs are more organizationally 
complex than loosely coupled international programs.  The organization 





Table 19:  TMO Internatinal Organizational Considerations  
TMO Framework Element:   
TMO International Organizational Considerations 
PROGRAM PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION VALUE COMMENT 
HAWK US Developed (Almost No 
coupling) With Foreign Sales and 
Production 
HIGH 
ROLAND Foreign Developed (Almost No 
Coupling) with US Production 
HIGH 
LANCE US Developed (No Coupling) with 
Foreign Sales 
HIGH 
MEADS Tightly Coupled International 






Loosely Coupled International 
Development 
HIGH 
MLRS TGW Tightly Coupled International HIGH 
This element can be 
used to characterize 
the nature of the 
program being 
considered.   The 
programs.  
Information 
collected in this 
framework element 
was distilled to 
create the Program 
Classification 
Column in this 
table.   Development with US Leadership 
 
 
b. RDEC/Contractor Technical Support  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has mixed value for evaluating international 
programs.  The value depends on the organizational aspects of the 
program.   Table 20 summarizes the value of  this element for an 
International TMO Framework considering the six programs reviewed.  
For programs with tight coupling between international partners, this is 
a crucial area for management attention.  For other programs, the 
technical value remains high for obtaining competent support, however, 





Table 20:  RDEC/Contractor Technical Support  
TMO Framework Element:   
RDEC/Contractor Technical Support 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW Minimal international considerations. The support provided 
was crucial, especially for system improvements and failure 
analysis.  After international production began, this technical 
support was critical for resolving international issues. 
ROLAND LOW Minimal international considerations, but critical for 
program, especially in overcoming MTBF and calibration 
problems.   
LANCE LOW Minimal international considerations, but critical for 
program, especially for technology transfer from Government 
Labs to industry 
MEADS HIGH Work Share complicates arranging for RDEC or contractor 
technical support.  Work share must be balanced between 
nations overall, but no mechanism is established for 
managing work share with RDEC, although arrangements 
have been made to manage work share for a support 
contractor.  Technology transfer issues make it unclear what 
kind of support RDEC and support contractors can provide if 
arrangements are made.  For US specific support, RDEC and 
support contractors are involved through the US NPO, but for 





LOW Each country is responsible for the portion of the ISS that it 
has agreed to build.  Boeing remains responsible for 
coordinating systems issues, and is able to access the NASA 
labs for technology and test assistance as needed.   
MLRS TGW HIGH RDEC was involved in MLRS TGW both for US Specific 
support and for international support. Work share was a 
consideration, but a mechanism was in place in the MLRS 
project office to track work share allocation.   Technology 
transfer issues were addressed effectively, although it was not 
always easy. 
 
(2)  The TMO Lessons Learned from the programs 
reviewed for the RDEC (or lab, in the case of NASA)/Contractor Technical 
Support were not surprising.  It was confirmed that TMO technical 
support is crucial for development of complex systems.  It is necessary to 
ensure contractor accountability, to do requirements analysis, to aid in 
technology transfer, in some cases to find solutions to problems that the 
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prime contractor is not well situated to solve, and to represent the user.  
The HAWK, Roland, LANCE and ISS programs did not encounter 
significant problems related to the international aspects of technical 
support.  Also, the MLRS TGW program successfully engaged the  RDEC 
and technical support community for both US specific and shared 
international activity.  MEADS has been able to engage the support 
contractor community  and RDEC for US specific activity but remains 
challenged to engaged RDEC for direct support of the international 
program.   
 
c. Management of Technical Requirements  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has mixed value for evaluating international 
programs.  The value depends on the organizational aspects of the 
program.  Table 21 summarizes the value of  this element for an 
International TMO Framework considering the six programs reviewed.  
For programs with tight coupling between international partners, 
management of technical requirements is a crucial area for management 
attention.  For other programs, it remains important to manage 
requirements effectively, however, for these programs there are few 
international issues related to requirements management.   
 
(2)  The TMO Lessons Learned from the programs 
reviewed for TMO requirements management for international programs 
are similar to what is known about major development programs in 
general.  First, the customer must be identified and his/her needs must 
be addressed.  For US programs, the customer is the User who 
represents the soldiers who will be responsible for the system.  For 
international programs, the customer is collectively the Users of the 
participating nations.   
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Table 21:  Management of Technical Requirements  
TMO Framework Element:  Management of Technical Requirements 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW Minimal international considerations. However, stable 
requirements were especially important once involvement 
began with the international community. 
ROLAND ZERO No international considerations.   U.S. requirements were 
the only consideration once the data package was obtained 
from the Europeans.   
LANCE ZERO LANCE was a US System sold to Europeans.  No 
international participation with requirements.  
MEADS HIGH MEADS is a tightly coupled international activity.  
Obtaining  initial agreement  on requirements was very time 
consuming requiring agreement from all parties.   As U.S. 
user requirements have matured, needed clarifications to 
the international requirements have not kept pace, mostly 
as a result of needing consensus from partner nations.   US 
user satisfaction with the MEADS system may hinge on 





MEDIUM Each country is responsible for the portion of the ISS that it 
has agreed to build and is responsible to maintain 
requirements for the system elements it is developing.  
Boeing is responsible for maintaining configuration control 
over key interfaces, such as the docking interface and the 
shuttle payload bay interface.  Boeing remains responsible 
for coordinating systems issues, and is able to access the 
NASA labs for technology and test assistance as needed.   
MLRS TGW HIGH Establishing a set initial requirements was difficult.  This 
applied particularly to the required target set.   This led to 
difficulties selecting technology from that available from the 
partners.  Except for the top level requirements, 
management of requirements changes, though difficult, was 
handled locally by empowered national technical 
representatives. 
The requirements analysis and update process, time 
consuming and cumbersome for US programs, is more difficult for 
international programs.  For international programs, the requirements 
and changes need to be agreed upon by all parties.  Thus, a significant 
lesson learned is that stabilizing requirements before initiating an 
international program is important.  Also, local country representatives 
should be empowered to make decisions for change of allocated 
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requirements that do not change the overall system requirements.  It 
should be understood by all national parties that some requirements will 
have to be changed or clarified.  It is difficult to get all the requirements 
100 percent correct at the start of a program. Nevertheless, requirements 
must stabilize before major requirements allocation and design activity 
begins, or else uncontrolled cost will result. 
  
d. Management of Technical Risk  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has value for evaluating most international 
programs reviewed.  For LANCE there was no framework value because, 
the program was managed solely by the US.  Table 22 summarizes the 
value of this element for an International TMO Framework for the six 
programs reviewed.   
For programs with tight coupling between 
international partners, international considerations for management of 
technical risk are crucial for management attention.  For other programs, 
there is value because of shared risk and the need to coordinate to 
address this risk. 
 
(2)  The lessons learned for Management of Technical 
Risk for the programs reviewed are valuable.  Participants in an 
international acquisition program should be prepared to aggressively 
address technical risk while remaining diplomatic and careful about 
assigning blame when issues arise.  There is risk of integrating systems 
into the US for systems that were developed and tested elsewhere.  For  
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Table 22:  Management of Technical Risk  
TMO Framework Element:  Management of Technical Risk 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK MEDIUM International considerations after international 
production.  Program risk continues after production, and 
when things go wrong, such as missiles blowing up 
during lot testing, finger pointing may begin, high level 
national representatives may get involved and the problem 
resolution made more difficult. 
ROLAND MEDIUM International considerations involved understanding the 
European developed processes and designs.   Further, 
Roland was assumed to be a mature system.   Some 
redesign was required to stabilize calibration of the radar. 
LANCE ZERO LANCE was a US System sold to Europeans.  No 
international participation with risk.  
MEADS HIGH MEADS is a tightly coupled international activity.   
MEADS pushes the state of the art for Radar and missile 
technology, and involves transfer of sensitive U.S. 
technology.  There is risk for successful integration of 
advanced technology and there is risk related to 
technology transfer.  The system has not yet been 
developed, and much effort will be required by all to 





MEDIUM Each country is responsible for the portion of the ISS that 
it has agreed to build and is responsible to maintain 
manage the risk for the system elements it is developing.  
The international considerations for risk involve 
interfaces.  Boeing’s unique approach providing the 
physical docking interfaces f between space station 
modules minimizes some of this concern.  Nevertheless, 
close international cooperation is needed when issues 
arise to ensure safety. 
MLRS TGW HIGH The varied nature of potential targets for TGW led to  
consideration of a variety of technologies, which were 
available in the different partner nations.  While technical 
considerations were the major risk driver, work share 
issues had influence, complicating the technical solutions 
and increasing risk.  Technology transfer issues were a 
factor, but because significant technology was coming 
from Europe, the risk of US technology transfer was 
minimized. 
 
this situation, objective testing should be done.  For tightly coupled 
international development activities, it is important to address 
technology transfer risk.  When access is limited, consideration should 
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be given to independent U.S. action.  While not the preferred approach 
from the point of the international partners, this may be the only viable 
option.  
 
e.  Technical Monitoring Capability  
(1) Framework Element Analysis. This TMO 
Framework Element has value for evaluating international programs, but 
it’s value is reduced because of the overlap between this element and the 
RDEC/Contract Support framework element.  Table 23 summarizes the 
value of this element for an International TMO Framework for the six 
programs reviewed.  
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned for technical monitoring for 
the six programs reviewed are limited because some of the pertinent data 
was collected under the RDEC/Contractor Technical Support framework 
element.  However, there was a re-emphasis of the importance of 
communicating diplomatically when U.S. monitoring of partner 
development is conducted.  NASA’s experience was that the NASA role of 
being watchdog for safety and reliability was accepted and NASA 
personnel and support contractors are accepted as part of the 
development teams.  The MLRS TGW program distributed responsibilities 
for oversight according to which nation was doing the work, which was 
effective.      
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Table 23:  Technical Monitoring Capability 
TMO Framework Element:  Technical Monitoring Capability 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW Some international consideration for technical monitoring.  
When production problems occurred in US, European 
production questioned the US provided data package and 
US consultants went overseas to evaluate.  Engineering 
evaluations became political and had a major influence on 
HAWK program international efforts. 
ROLAND ZERO US Program was only concerned with US production and 
fielding 
LANCE ZERO 100 % US managed effort.  TMO Technical Monitoring did 
not have international considerations. 
MEADS MEDIUM TMO Technical monitoring is affected by cost share and 
work share along with technology transfer.  There is an 
overlap between this TMO Framework element and the 
RDEC/Contractor Support TMO Framework Element, 






MEDIUM TMO Technical Monitoring did involve international 
considerations for ISS, particularly because safety of 
operations is paramount for NASA.  Overlap of this element 
with RDEC/Support Contractor TMO Framework Element 
reduces value.  Additionally, as the MEADS program 
progresses past the planning activities and into 
development, this framework element may increase in 
value. 
MLRS TGW MEDIUM This framework element  was of value because it brought  
focus to the distribution of responsibilities for TMO 
Technical monitoring among the participating nations.  
However, the value was reduced because of the overlap with 
another framework element. 
 
f. Direct Technical Contribution  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has value for describing international programs.  
The value is related to the degree of coupling between partner-nation 
management processes.  Additionally, Table 24 summarizes the value of 




Table 24:  Direct Technical Contribution 
TMO Framework Element:  Direct Technical Contribution 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW Little of the HAWK TMO Direct Technical Contribution 
was international in nature or constrained by the 
international nature of the program.   
ROLAND LOW Little of the ROLAND TMO Direct Technical Contribution 
was international in nature or constrained by the nature 
of the program. 
LANCE ZERO TMO Direct Technical Contribution did not have 
international considerations. 
MEADS HIGH The value for MEADS is evident for requirements analysis 
for both US specific effort and international effort.  
Additionally, effort to develop a comprehensive yet concise 
SOW for the future D&D development phase will be 
important.  Important contributions related to obtaining 
approvals for technology transfer are anticipated.   In 
addition, contributions made by RDEC/Support 
Contractors will be important, but this is described in 






MEDIUM The technical contributions of NASA tended to be in the 
technology area where the labs were involved and in 
procedures intended to ensure safety and reliability.   
However, this framework element overlapped with the 
RDEC/Support contractor element, minimizing the value 
of this element relative to the ISS and the TMO 
framework. 
MLRS TGW HIGH Personnel from each nation were competent with opinions 
about  the best technical approaches.  Having a high 
degree of talent in the TMO activity was both a good and 
bad.  The good part was that difficult technical issues 
received a lot of TMO attention, helping to ensure that 
problems were understood and thoroughly addressed.  
The bad part about this was that sometimes progress was 
slowed by the variety of opinions that had to be addressed 
fairly.  Addressing problems that turned out not to be 







(2) TMO Lessons Learned for direct technical 
contribution for the six programs reviewed are that there is high value in 
technical contributions from TMO personnel for both U.S. and 
international development programs.  For international development 
programs, work share and technology transfer issues complicate 
availability of personnel and information, TMO direct technical 
contributions are crucial for program success.   Requirements analysis 
and SOW preparation are valuable areas for direct technical contribution 
for international programs.  For tightly coupled international programs, 
work share and technology transfer concerns will complicate this effort.  
Additionally, TMO interfaces with other programs and agencies can 
provide valuable direct technical contribution in the identifying of and 
resolving of issues that are driven by interface to other programs. 
 
g. Control of and Access to Technical Data  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has mixed value for describing international 
programs.  The value relates to the coupling between partner-nation 
management processes.   Table 25 summarizes the value of this element 
for an International TMO Framework for the six programs reviewed.  
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.   Control of and access to 
technical data for international programs with tight coupling is critical.  
The more information that is exchanged for the execution of a program, 
the more important effective configuration control is.  Also, if any of the 
participating nations have technology release restrictions, it is important 
to have clear technology release policy. 
A negative lesson learned during the interview process 
for this research paper, but not attributed to any one program is that 






hTable 25:  Control of and Access to Technical Data  
TMO Framework Element:   
Control of and Access to Technical Data 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW There was little application of this international TMO 
framework element for HAWK  development that was 
revealed by the interview.  Export control decisions had to 
be made, but they were for the system and specific 
information needed to field and operate the system.    
ROLAND ZERO There was no application of this international TMO 
framework element for Roland. 
LANCE ZERO There was no application of this international TMO 
framework element for LANCE that was uncovered by the 
interview.  However, the issues surrounding export 
control would be worth investigating. 
MEADS HIGH Configuration Control is expected to be more difficult due 
to the increased number of stakeholders associated with 
the system requirements.   Procedures will need to be 
worked out to address this.  International aspects of 
technology transfer have proven tedious, with no 
guarantees up front about specifically what will or will not 





LOW The control of specifications and interfaces for the ISS is 
critical, however, the main common concern is for the 
interfaces, such as the docking interfaces and the Shuttle 
payload bay interface for transport of ISS components. As 
to access to technical information, it is not an issue. 
NASA has a policy of openly sharing information with all 
parties that have a legitimate interest.   
MLRS TGW HIGH Establishing access to US information was challenging for 
MLRS.  Secure communications links were established by 
providing encryption and communications equipment to 
partner nations.  The flow of information between national 
program offices was difficult and required special 
accommodation. eleased and then the release policy is further restricted.  The lesson: 
ake sure release policies are well established before providing data to 
nternational partners.  International incidents may occur if release 
olicy is made more restrictive as a program progresses.   People get 
pset.  Countries feel insulted.  Issues of this nature may rise to the 
ighest levels of Government. 
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Special arrangements should be made for transmittal 
of technical information between countries.  U.S. Policies for technology 
transfer do not seem to be consistent with international agreements for 
cooperative development.  There are advocates and detractors for more 
openness.  In a fully cooperative development, one would think that all 
national parties would bring all of their technical knowledge to the 
program.  However, the U.S. has not yet made that level of commitment 
to international programs.  Concern for security of information and a fear 
that vulnerabilities of other systems may be revealed, lead the U.S. to 
carefully scrutinize all requests for information.    
 
h. User Participation  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has mixed value for describing international 
programs.  The value is related to the degree of coupling between 
partner-nation management processes.   Table 26 summarizes the value 
of this element for an International TMO Framework for the six programs 
reviewed.  
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  User participation is 
important for any major development effort, particularly for establishing 
overall requirements, human system interface requirements and other 
user related requirements such as training and maintenance.  In 
international programs, means for coordinating clarifications and 
updates of requirements is critical.  Program management understanding 
of how the various Users plan to fight the system is critical.  
Understanding of how training for the system will be done is critical.  
Establishing an understanding of how the system will be tested in a user 
environment, usually called Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
(IOT&E) in the U.S. is critical.  
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Table 26:  User Participation 
TMO Framework Element:  User Participation 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW There was no international User consideration for HAWK 
development.   
ROLAND LOW There was no international User consideration for Roland 
development, however, the US user was vitally concerned 
with ensuring that ROLAND met its advertised performance. 
LANCE LOW There was no international User consideration for LANCE 
development.   
MEADS HIGH User participation is typically less for European system 
development than for US development.  Understanding this 
is important to participants in international programs.  In 
the case of MEADS US participants, there is an expectation 
of early and continuous User involvement.  However, the 
same is not true for other participants.  The balance 






Low This framework element may not apply to NASA because of 
the way NASA is organized.  NASA both writes the 
requirements for its systems and then develops the systems.  
Astronauts can be looked at as users of the ISS, however, 
they did not get involved in writing a requirements document 
for the ISS.  Astronauts do get involved in developing some of 
the requirements related to Human System Integration. 
MLRS TGW HIGH International User participation was critical for establishing 
the basic requirements of TGW.  This was recognized by 
including on the TGW Management Executive Committee 
both the national PM for MLRS and the national User 
representative. 
  
i. Cost Share and Work Share  
(1) Framework Element Analysis. This TMO 
Framework Element has mixed value for describing international 
programs.  Its value relates to the international coupling. Table 27 
summarizes the value of this element for an International TMO 
Framework for the six programs reviewed.  
 
121 
Table 27:  Cost Share and Work Share  
TMO Framework Element:  Cost Share and Work Share 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW There was no international Cost Share and Work Share 
consideration for HAWK development, although 
arrangements were made for co-production of HAWK in 
Europe and Japan. 
ROLAND LOW There was no international Cost Share and Work Share 
consideration for Roland development, however, the US 
bought and produced ROLAND partially to offset European 
purchases of US systems such as HAWK 
LANCE LOW There was no international User consideration for LANCE 
development.   
MEADS HIGH Cost share and work share arrangements for MEADS are 
critical to continued participation by all parties.  
Establishing a method for managing overall work share to 
allow participation of national laboratories such as RDEC 
will be important if significant program involvement of these 





Low There was and is no consideration for cost share or work 
share related to the ISS.  Participants pay for whatever 




HIGH Cost share and work share were carefully managed for MLRS 
TGW.  The program manager, who was a US Army Colonel, 
was responsible for balancing the overall work share.  
Unique arrangements were made to minimize foreign 
currency conversions. 
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  Cost share and work share 
are not applicable to all international development efforts.  If Cost share 
and work share are required in an international effort, then they must be 
balanced according to international agreement.  The percentages are very 
important to the personnel from participating nations.  Their authority to 
participate in the program is tied not only to overall cost, but also to cost 
share and work share.    
It is important to establish mechanisms for managing 
cost share and work share early in the program.  Having a process 
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managed directly by the International Program Office will enable access 
to national laboratories as well as to support contractors. 
Ideally, an understanding should be reached that work 
share can be balanced over several program phases.  For instance, if 
work share gets out of balance during development, then the possibility 
should exist to bring work share into balance during production.  One 
way of doing this is to allocate proceeds from external sales to make up 
for shortfalls in work share.  Countries are loath to pay other countries 
from their treasuries to make up for differences in work share.  
 
j. Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOW)   
(1) Framework Element Analysis. This TMO 
Framework Element has value for the review of tightly coupled 
international programs.  Table 28 summarizes the value of this element 
for an International TMO Framework for the six programs reviewed.  
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  The primary lesson learned 
about preparation of contract SOWs for international development 
programs is that considerable time is required to obtain agreement of 
content by the participating nations.  Each nation must go through an 
independent staffing process.  This is time consuming.  TMO is involved 
with development of the SOWs because SOWs for a major system 
development primarily address technical work to be performed.  
The development of a SOW will typically be led by a 
senior technical person or persons.   Having people in the process that 
are personable and able to make useful compromises with their 
international counterparts is extremely important.  Also, the earlier 
issues are addressed, the better.  A bad SOW is not more likely to gain 
approval as it gets older.    
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FTMO Framework Element:   
Preparation of Contract Statements of Work (SOWs) 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK ZERO There was no international coordination for preparation of 
SOWs 
ROLAND ZERO There was no international coordination for preparation of 
SOWs 
LANCE ZERO There was no international coordination for preparation of 
SOWs 
MEADS HIGH National participant in MEADS, represented by its National 
Product Office has been keen to ensure its interests are 





ZERO There was no international coordination for preparation of 
SOWs 
MLRS TGW HIGH The SOW requirements had to go through each nation’s 
decision processes and obtaining agreement was time 
consuming and laborious. 
 2.  Program Feedback And Inputs Affecting TMO 
a. International Executive Control   
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This element adds 
ttle value to the International TMO Framework because the information 
at might be collected under this element has already been collected 
nder the element “TMO Organizational Aspects.” 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  No additional lessons 
arned from those captured by the International Organizational Aspects 
ramework Element. 
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 b. TMO Funding 
(1) Framework Element Analysis. This element adds 
little value to the International TMO Framework because the information 
that might be collected under this element has already been collected 
under the element “Cost Share and Work Share.” 
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  No additional lessons 
learned from those captured by the Cost Share, Work Share TMO 
Framework Element. 
 
c. National Interaction  
(1) Framework Element Analysis. This TMO 
Framework Element has limited value for the review of loosely coupled  
and high value for tightly coupled international programs.   Error! 
Reference source not found. summarizes the value of this element for 
an International TMO Framework for the six programs reviewed.  
 
(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  Regarding national 
interaction, not all international programs with international aspects 
have a combined international program office per se, however, by 
definition there is some national interaction in all international 
programs.  Patience and diplomacy are important.  European nations 
participate in more cooperative development efforts than does the U.S., 
and are more accustomed to the international environment.  The U.S. 
acquisition personnel are learning, but are inexperienced with 
international programs.  Technology transfer issues slow communication 
between the U.S. community and international programs, and a priority 
is placed on protecting information over making it available to the  
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 TMO Framework Element:  National Interaction 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK MEDIUM National Interaction limited mostly to coordination for 
purchase of complete HAWK missile systems, the Tech 
Data Package or individual system upgrades.  However, 
US consultants reviewed European Operations because of 
missile failures blamed on U.S. Technical data package. 
ROLAND LOW The burden of international coordination fell on the US 
contractor.  There was a US/European Roland Liaison 
office, however this did not affect TMO. 
LANCE ZERO There was no unique national interaction. 
MEADS HIGH Formal national interaction is guided by the MEADS 
MOU, and this interaction between national participants 
and the MEADS program is through the Steering 
Committee.  US personnel in the IPO are sometimes 
considered foreign nationals and sometimes US 





LOW There was little national interaction for the related to 
TMO.  As described in other framework elements, Boeing 
maintains the critical interfaces and does the system 
engineering work.  
MLRS TGW HIGH Valuable information was obtained relating to the 
knowledge of personnel in the US acquisition process to 
accommodate international programs.  The US acquisition 
structure was not prepared to address international 
programs, and a lot of energy was required to educate 
participants in the US acquisition process about 
international programs 
 
 ernational program.  The international program office may be 
nsidered a foreign entity, and all of its personnel, including U.S. 
izens, may be considered foreign agents.   
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 d.  U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to the Next Program 
Phase  
(1) Framework Element Analysis.  This TMO 
Framework Element has limited value for the review of loosely coupled  
and medium to high value for tightly coupled international programs.  
Table 30 summarizes the value of this element for an International TMO 
Framework for the six programs reviewed.  
TMO Framework Element:   
U.S. Acquisition Review Prior to Next Program Phase 
PROGRAM VALUE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM APPLICATION  
HAWK LOW HAWK considered international aspects of the program for 
its acquisition strategy.  International sales reduced costs 
because missile quantities were increased.  However, the 
process itself was unaffected by international aspects. 
ROLAND LOW ROLAND was purchase from the European developers as a 
technical data package, and this influenced the acquisition 
process.   
LANCE ZERO No International Influence on Acquisition Process 
MEADS HIGH The US acquisition process is separate  from the German 
and Italian acquisition processes and the processes are not 
synchronized.  The US NPO is controlled by the International 
Program Office, but provides an interface to the US 
acquisition process.  US acquisition regulations do not 
necessarily apply to the MEADS acquisition.  This can lead 
to frustration among US employees assigned to the 





ZERO The ISS does not have acquisition phases that correspond to 
the US Defense acquisition phases. 
MLRS 
TGW 
MEDIUM The US acquisition process was similar to  that for other 
U.S. systems.  One exception was that an effort was made to 
harmonize documentation so that a document developed to 
satisfy the US acquisition review process would also satisfy 
the European processes.  Sometimes non-standard formats 
were used for documents to satisfy U.S. acquisition review. 
Requirements. 
 
Table 30:  U.S. Acquisition Review 
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(2) TMO Lessons Learned.  U.S. policy for conduct of 
international programs is confused, and this affects the acquisition 
review process.  U.S. acquisition review prior to going into succeeding 
program phases is flexible and tailored to meet the needs of U.S. 
programs via DOD 5000 series documents.  These documents 
acknowledge international programs, but need to be matured in this 
area.  DOD 5000.2r, Mandatory Defense Acquisition Procedures requires 
the developing agency (such as the Army) to create standard acquisition 
documentation.  This is in conflict with the need to generate one set of 
acquisition documents to satisfy all nations that participate. Continued 
debate is needed about the degree of U.S. commitment for international 
programs.  Debate is needed about whether security concerns should 
dominate policy or whether effective partnership should dominate policy.  
Relaxing security restrictions would allow direct interaction between 
international program offices and the U.S. acquisition process, and 
would improve efficiency, however the negative side of this is added risk 






ACAT Acquisition Category 
AMCOM Aviation and Missile Command 
AMD Air and Missile Defense 
APB Acquisition Program Baseline 
C4ISP Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence Support Plan  
CM Configuration Management 
CPI Critical Program Information 
DOD Department of Defense 
DODD DOD Directive 
DODI DOD Instruction 
DT Developmental Testing 
DSMC Defense Systems Management College  
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FRP Full Rate Production 
HIS Human System Integration 
HWIL HardWare In the Loop 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IPO International Product Office 
ITRD International Technical Requirements Document 
MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System 
MICOM Missile Command 
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System 
MNS Mission Need Statement 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
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NAMEADSMA NATO MEADS Management Agency 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPO National Product Office 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OT Operational Testing 
PM Program Manager 
PMO Program Management Office 
RDEC Research, Development and Engineering Center 
SD&D System Development and Demonstration 
SEMP System Engineering Management Plan 
SOW Statement Of Work 
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan  
TGW Tactical Guided Warhead 
TMO Technical Management Oversight 
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